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Abstract
 Despite growing academic interest in refugees and international humanitarian 
responses, the influx of refugees from the Central African Republic into eastern 
Cameroon, ongoing since 2005, has received little attention in scholarship or even in 
popular media. Though we know much about what can go wrong in large-scale, 
politicized refugee crises, less is known about how  the refugee response works in more 
“everyday” refugee situations to effectively address the needs of refugees and their host 
communities. Drawing on ethnographic research conducted among humanitarian NGOs 
during a semester in Cameroon, I examine the implications for the host country of the 
routinized response to a relatively straightforward refugee crisis. I argue that the situation 
in eastern Cameroon contributes much to our understanding of how the international 
community can better assist refugees around the world.
 My analysis of this response has yielded three key insights. First, a 
professionalized international refugee regime has responded using best practices built on 
experience, which suggests a cultural shift toward evidence-based approaches to 
humanitarian interventions. Second, integration of refugees into local communities has 
benefits that extend beyond the humanitarian space in which refugee services are 
administered. These benefits impact Cameroon’s processes of nation-building. Third, this 
nation-building reinforces Cameroon’s position as a state within the international 
community, fitting it more firmly into what scholar Liisa Malkki calls the “national order 
of things.”
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Figure One: Map of Cameroon
Chapter One
 Introduction
 The humanitarian presence in this Cameroonian city is palpable. Bertoua, the 
administrative capital of the East region, boasts numerous signs directing passersby to 
various non-governmental organizations (NGOs); white trucks of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are ubiquitous. Even Bertouans whose lives 
do not seem directly impacted by the presence of refugees from the Central African 
Republic (CAR) are aware of the humanitarian presence in their city.  Interest in this 
presence drew me to Bertoua: what does an international response to a refugee influx 
mean for refugees, local host communities, and the nation?  This is a particularly salient 
question as international media headlines focus on places like Darfur or Somalia but 
seem to overlook smaller, less geo-strategically significant, and, by my assessment, 
effective responses to refugee situations.  The time I spent in Bertoua in April 2012, and 
my desire to investigate this question, became the starting points for this thesis.
 In the pages that follow, I focus on the situation in eastern Cameroon to argue that 
this routinized refugee response has much to contribute to our understanding of how the 
international community can effectively address the needs of refugees around the world. 
(I use the term “routinized refugee response” or “routinized crisis” throughout this thesis 
to refer to situations such as that in eastern Cameroon which are the foil to “complex 
humanitarian emergencies.” Unlike in cases where population movements are in the 
hundreds of thousands and humanitarian actors must work in a context of ongoing 
insecurity, in routinized crises organizations can implement their programs according to 
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policies and routines formulated from experience and evidence). Analysis of the situation 
in eastern Cameroon yields three key insights. First, a professionalized international 
refugee regime1, using solutions and best practices built on experience, has handled the 
situation in a routinized way; this suggests a cultural shift toward evidence-based 
approaches to humanitarian interventions. Second, integration of refugees into local 
communities has benefits that extend far beyond the humanitarian space in which refugee 
services are administered and, in fact, has significant implications for processes of nation-
building in Cameroon as a whole.  And third, this nation-building reinforces Cameroon’s 
position as a state within the international community. That such insights arise from a 
little-researched crisis suggests an important opportunity for applied anthropology to 
shape humanitarian policy through evaluation of successful intervention models. 
 When I speak of success in this thesis--a concept that is central to my argument 
because I observe that the success of the humanitarian intervention is what has allowed 
for the broader development impacts on Cameroon--I am referring to success from the 
point of view of the humanitarian organizations with which I primarily worked in my 
research. For people at these organizations, success means that refugees’ and host 
communities’ basic needs are met--there are not significant problems of health, hunger, or 
homelessness--and communities are making observable progress toward autonomy and 
self-sufficiency. Though “success” could be understood as an abstract and highly 
subjective concept, the organizations with which I worked have attempted to devise 
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1 The refugee regime has been defined by Charles Keely (2001:303) as “the collection of conventions, 
treaties, intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, precedent, and funding which governments 
have adopted and support to protect and assist those displaced from their country by persecution, or 
displaced by war in some regions of the world where agreements or practice have extended protection to 
persons displaced by the general devastation of war, even if they are not specifically targeted for 
persecution.”
objective ways of measuring it. They set quantitative goals at the beginning of a project, 
such as improving the enrollment of girls in schools by five percent or that fifty percent 
of community members will make use of a well, and define success as meeting that goal. 
They also reported using more qualitative measures of success, such as surveying 
villagers on their satisfaction with humanitarian projects. In addition to forming my 
understanding of what constitutes success throughout this thesis, the importance my 
informants placed on measuring success contributes to my argument about shifts toward 
evidence-based procedures in humanitarian interventions.  
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations
Refugees and the National Order of Things
 I argue, then, that the routinized response used in the East promotes Cameroon’s 
development and international status. This observation challenges humanitarian scholars 
(Fassin 2011; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010; Keely 2001; Loescher 2001) who argue that the 
development of international humanitarianism erodes systems based on the ideal of 
national sovereignty. In exploring this challenge, I turn to Liisa Malkki:
 One of the most illuminating ways of getting at the categorical quality of the 
 national order of things is to examine what happens when this order is challenged 
 or subverted. Refugees can represent precisely such a subversion. They are an 
 “abomination” (Douglas 1966) produced and made meaningful by the categorical 
 order itself, even as they are excluded from it. [Malkki 1995:6]
 We tend to take Malkki’s “national order of things” as a given; the world is divided into 
discrete nation-states that relate to each other in certain accepted ways. The presence of 
refugees calls this national order of things into question. Refugees exist in a liminal space 
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between states; they are an “abomination,” belonging neither in one place nor the other. 
Malkki argues that by existing in the gaps in the national order, refugees reveal its 
mythical nature. I take this argument a step further, regarding the international refugee 
regime as a macro-level response aimed at cleansing society of the “pollution” of 
refugees. Refugees highlight the cracks in the categorical order of nation-states but also 
provide a sanctioned avenue for reinforcing the normativity of that order. As it pursues its 
three “durable solutions”--repatriation, local settlement, and third-country resettlement--
the refugee regime reinforces the nation-state ideal by affirming that every person should 
belong to a recognized state. This idea is reminiscent of Max Gluckman’s writing on 
“rites of reversal”--instances in which the normal order is reversed are precisely those 
situations through which that order is preserved and reinforced (Gluckman 1967).  
 My research in Cameroon highlights another facet of this reinforcing role of the 
international refugee regime. The international NGOs that facilitate the integration of 
refugees in eastern Cameroon contribute significantly to Cameroon’s development. 
Through creation of infrastructure and provision of material resources, building of human 
capital, and consultation around international norms, humanitarian NGOs contribute at 
least as much to Cameroon as a state as they do to refugees from the CAR. This 
problematizes the divide between humanitarian and development activities. If 
humanitarian aid is to contribute to development processes, we must consider Ferguson’s 
(1990) assertion that development projects can strengthen a state’s power at the periphery 
of its territory. This suggestion provides a useful framework for understanding how 
humanitarian contributions to Cameroon’s development fortify its claim to being a 
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sovereign nation-state in the eyes of the international community. By more solidly 
bringing the marginal East region into the national fold, the refugee regime does not 
erode national sovereignty so much as it reinforces Cameroon’s international legitimacy.    
 This thesis builds on work by numerous other scholars who have made refugees, 
and international humanitarianism, their focus of study. In anthropology, as in other 
disciplines, scholarship on refugees has become an important subfield, with many 
scholars studying refugee populations in concentrated areas such as refugee camps or, 
increasingly, in multi-sited ethnographies of the diaspora (Ong 2003; Shandy 2007). 
These scholars have shaped the idea of “refugee” into a knowable subject for research 
(Malkki 1995a). My own understanding of the need to study the refugee situation in 
Cameroon thus builds on the foundation laid by these scholars. 
 Some of the earliest scholars of refugees in African contexts, such as Gould 
(1974), Hansen (1981), and Nobel (1982), write about refugees in broad terms. They 
grapple with what makes an “African refugee” different from refugees in other regions, 
with definitions and categorizations, and with problems with arbitrary African borders 
(Pitterman 1984; Zetter 1988; Zolberg et al. 1989). They raise important issues that 
continue to influence refugee studies: the questionable accuracy of statistics in African 
crises, the legacies of historic migratory patterns, the fact that refugees are not powerless 
victims without agency, and discrepancies in access to services between urban and rural 
refugees. However, the generalized approach of these scholars has become less common.  
 Instead, as more scholars began to study refugees, topics of research became 
increasingly specialized. A good example of this is Liisa Malkki’s work. Malkki spent a 
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year in rural western Tanzania with Hutu refugees who had fled Burundi in 1972. 
Drawing on field research among refugees settled in both local towns and refugee camps, 
Malkki constructs a comparative analysis of the groups’ understandings of identity, 
history, homeland, and exile (Malkki 1995a:2). The result is an “ethnography of 
displacement,” as Malkki terms it:
 It is not an ethnography of any eternal place or “its people,” nor is its aim to give 
 a comprehensive account of the social life of “a community.” Instead...it is 
 concerned to explore how displacement and deterritorialization-conditions which 
 are “normal” for increasingly large numbers of people today-may shape the 
 social construction of “nationness” and history, identity and enmity. [Malkki 
 1995a:1]
Malkki’s ethnography represents a transformed understanding both of refugees and of 
ethnography itself. From an early anthropological view of ethnography as a tool for 
cataloguing static and timeless societies, Malkki reinterprets it to document social change 
and physical movement. Malkki is less concerned with categorizing migrants, instead 
content to study the lived daily realities of the “increasingly large numbers of people” for 
whom displacement is experienced as normal (Malkki 1995a:1). These shifts illustrate 
well the process within anthropology of constructing refugees as a domain of study.
 Any study relating to refugees, then, must recognize that “refugee” is a 
constructed category of understanding, shaped by academic perspectives but also by 
definitions in international law that have developed out of particular historical contexts 
(taken up in more detail in Chapter Two) and by perceptions in popular discourse. As 
Zolberg et al. argue, however, simply because the refugee label is a human construct does 
not does not erase the significance it holds in the lives of those to whom it is applied: 
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 Refugee has become a category on whose basis international organizations and 
 individual states engage in a process of worldwide triage. Refugee status is a 
 privilege or entitlement, giving those who qualify access to certain scarce 
 resources or services outside their own country, such as admission into another 
 country ahead of a long line of claimants, legal protection abroad, and often some 
 material assistance from private or public agencies. [1989:3]
A study that, as mine does, examines the benefits that result from a refugee response must 
understand the history and development of “refugee” as a category. Such an 
understanding also yields insight into the differential application of the concept around 
the world; it illuminates how the refugee label may be expanded to encompass increasing 
numbers of people in the global South (internally displaced persons, “environmental 
refugees,” those displaced by conflict), while simultaneously shrinking to exclude certain 
kinds of people from access to the global North (Fassin 2011; Keely 2001; Zetter 2007).
 The process of constructing refugees as a domain of knowledge has continued as 
scholars study refugees from a variety of theoretical perspectives and in relation to an 
ever-increasing number of other social phenomena: racism, xenophobia, immigration 
policies, state practices of violence and war, human rights, state sovereignty, 
development, diaspora, and memory, among others (Malkki 1995b). Much scholarship 
examines refugees in relation to decolonization, documenting the global shift to regarding 
refugees primarily as a third-world problem (Harrell-Bond 1986; Hein 1993; Malkki 
1995b:503). Scholars have studied refugees from the macro-level perspective of 
international relations and security, regarding population displacement and control as 
crucial factors in foreign policy (Loescher 1992, 2001; Malkki 1995b:504). An 
interdisciplinary “refugee studies” approach provides a more micro-level perspective 
based on case studies of specific situations (Malkki 1995b:507; Stein 1981; Zetter 1988). 
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 Probably the largest domain of research links refugees to the development 
discourse, investigating the impacts of refugees and refugee assistance on processes of 
development (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Harrell-Bond 1986; Hein 1993; Jacobsen 
2002; Malkki 1995b:506). Humanitarianism and development are understood as separate 
processes, with differing senses of temporality: humanitarianism is a short-term response 
to an emergency while development involves longer-term changes to societal processes 
and structures. However, practitioners increasingly recognize the importance of 
negotiating the transition between humanitarianism and development, suggesting a 
change from past assertions of a firmer division. Much of the activity in Cameroon at the 
time of my field research fell into a grey area between humanitarianism and 
development; my analysis thus places me within the tradition of scholars examining the 
arbitrary divide between the two spheres as well as their mutual impacts. 
 In addition to the many perspectives on refugees themselves, a body of 
scholarship examines the international networks and organizations that respond to 
refugee crises. Three main categories emerge within this literature. The first includes 
documentation of the emergence of an international refugee regime, including the 
development of the UNHCR and other intergovernmental and international organizations 
(Bass 2008; Betts 2009; Loescher 2001; Minear 2002). These works highlight the 
inherently political nature of international humanitarian work, challenging the popular 
conception of such work as wholly altruistic. In fact, these scholars argue, the refugee 
regime is bound up in other systems of global governance and plays a role in negotiations 
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around states, borders, and power (see Chapter Two). A recognition of the political 
undertones of humanitarianism guides my writing.
 A second perspective on the refugee regime is highly critical. This perspective 
builds on the work of Barbara Harrell-Bond, one of the first scholars to critically examine 
the impacts of international aid on refugees and their host communities (1987). More 
recent examples include the works found in Fassin and Pandolfi’s 2010 anthology. This 
volume turns a critical eye on many facets of international humanitarianism, including 
the construction of an emergency (Calhoun 2010; Ophir 2010), the growing militarization 
of humanitarian interventions (Orford 2010; Vasquez Lezama 2010), the paradoxical 
existence of “permanent states of emergency” (Pandolfi 2010), a growing international 
acceptance of the right or even responsibility to intervene in emergencies (Chikuhwa 
2012; Makaremi 2010), and the substitution of humanitarian action for more overt 
politics (Fassin 2010, MacFalls 2010). Many of these scholars question the very motives 
behind humanitarian interventions. 
 These critical scholars point out that the outside political interests associated with 
a crisis can render humanitarian efforts ineffective or even harmful. The importance of 
such studies is undeniable; where our model for humanitarian aid has failed, we must 
understand why in order to solve the problems. As the field of humanitarianism has 
developed, “there is far greater readiness to canvass criticism and acknowledge difficulty. 
Nobility of purpose no longer confers immunity from sociological critique” (de Waal 
2005:viii). Such critique should apply even where the model has not visibly failed. 
Sociological critique that does not uncover abuses or mistakes can still uncover important 
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societal dynamics that add to our overall understanding of the current state of 
humanitarian affairs. Studies of humanitarian approaches, both failures and successes, are 
important for creating better models that avoid the well-documented mistakes of the past. 
 A third approach to studying humanitarian responses includes elements of this 
critical perspective but focuses on a more operational-level understanding of the work of 
humanitarian organizations. This perspective is well-represented by the work of Fiona 
Terry (2002), who writes about her experiences working with Médecins sans Frontières 
(MSF) in Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire in the mid-1990s. Terry acknowledges that 
problems like militarization of refugee camps contributed to ongoing violence (Terry 
2002:7). However, she also presents an experience-based argument for efforts to improve 
“humanitarian action in a second-best world” (Terry 2002:216). Mary Anderson (1999), 
similarly, argues that the dangers associated with humanitarian action are not justification 
for dismantling the whole system. While action sometimes has problematic outcomes, the 
choice not to act has consequences of its own. These scholars suggest that, while 
humanitarian action may never be free from inherent risks, outcomes can be consistently 
improved to more effectively and ethically assist people in need. 
 My thesis builds on these ideas about humanitarianism’s potential to be an 
imperfect solution for an imperfect world, even as it draws on other scholars’ assertions 
about the political effects of the refugee regime. Though I speak to what is working in the 
intervention in Cameroon, I do not mean to suggest that nothing problematic is occurring. 
For example, as I will discuss in Chapter Four, many of my informants were concerned 
about widespread corruption. Understanding where problems arise is unquestionably 
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crucial to finding solutions; I argue, however, that too often we adopt a solely problem-
centric approach. In this thesis I choose to also examine how analysis of instances of 
success can strengthen the solutions we create. In this choice I build on the work of 
scholars such as Neil Thin (2012), who affirm that researching what is working can help 
inform policy decisions. The literature lacks a perspective on a routinized response such 
as that in eastern Cameroon. Very little has been written on refugees in Cameroon in 
general, and virtually nothing has been published on the most recent influx of Central 
African refugees into the East region; my work thus builds on the tradition of the scholars 
cited above while laying a foundation for addressing this gap in the literature. 
Ethnography among humanitarian NGOs
 The field research for this thesis formed part of my Spring 2012 semester abroad 
with a School for International Training (SIT) program titled Social Pluralism and 
Development. The final portion of the program was a month-long Independent Study, 
which I chose to spend in Bertoua, investigating the response to Central African refugees 
in the region. During my time in Bertoua, I lived with a local family, immersed myself in 
their daily life, and interviewed individuals involved in working with refugees. 
 My interest in this refugee situation was sparked by an earlier class project in 
which I discovered a dearth of scholarly, journalistic, or even practitioner investigation of 
the situation. Despite the presence of more than 100,000 refugees of various nationalities, 
Cameroonian refugee situations were deemed “silent” and “forgotten” crises in NGO 
press releases (MSF 2007; UNHCR 2007a; UNHCR 2007b; UNHCR 2010). As a study 
15
abroad student, I brought with me some lingering questions: how are refugee crises being 
handled in Cameroon? And why has the crisis in the East received so little attention?
 During my month researching humanitarian organizations in Bertoua, I answered 
some of these questions. I learned about the basic realities of the refugee response 
network--which actors are present, what roles they play, and how they interact. However, 
new questions arose around the lack of attention given to the situation in Cameroon. 
When does a refugee crisis receive intensive international attention, scrutiny, and 
funding, and when does it instead become an “everyday” problem for a professionalized 
regime? Why, if international attention translates into more money for aid, would 
Cameroon avoid creating highly visible refugee camps and instead integrate refugees into 
local communities? How do all of these questions tie into the political realities of a post-
Cold War, post-colonial world based around a nation-state system linked to an 
international community? Through subsequent library research and theoretical framing I 
was able to respond to some of these questions, and my findings inform the argument for 
this thesis. Other questions will require further research and analysis to answer fully.
 The East is an important part of Cameroon for the study of refugee issues due to 
the refugee influx which has continued in varying degrees of intensity since 2005. These 
refugees, fleeing ethnic persecution that manifests in “banditry” and kidnapping in the 
CAR, have mostly settled in eastern Cameroonian communities, though some have 
moved north into the Adamaoua region, and some have migrated to major cities such as 
Yaoundé. The population increase from those refugees who do remain in the East adds 
strain on the infrastructure of a region with the reputation as one of the least developed in 
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Cameroon. To assist both refugees and local communities, a flourishing NGO community  
has sprung up in the East, coordinated by major intergovernmental organizations such as 
the UNHCR. My research focused on the approaches and attitudes of these organizations, 
rather than on the perspectives of refugees themselves. 
 As I investigated this NGO community, my principal method of field study was 
based on the Spradley-McCurdy method of ethnographic interviewing. I conducted a total 
of twenty interviews with individuals related in some capacity to the refugee response in 
the East. Most of these interviews were with employees of two different NGOs: Plan 
Cameroon (Plan), an international NGO focused primarily on community development, 
and Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI), a French NGO working 
specifically in refugee crises. I interviewed the directors of both organizations’ field 
offices in Bertoua several times to gain a sense of the structure and activities of each 
organization and how their foundational principles and philosophies shape their approach 
to working with refugee communities in the East. I also interviewed four to five other 
individuals at each organization to include a wider range of voices and perspectives.2 In 
total, my interviews at the NGOs allowed me to compare two approaches to working with 
refugee and host communities and to understanding refugee emergencies as distinct from 
or tied to local processes of development.  
 To round out my understanding of the refugee response, I interviewed a 
representative of the UNHCR in Bertoua about the overall infrastructure of organizations 
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2 A list of my interviews, with brief descriptions of my informants and their roles in the organizations, can 
be found at the end of my bibliography. When I quote my informants in the body of this text, I leave the 
quotes in the original language to preserve the authentic voice of my informants; translations for French 
quotes are provided in footnotes.
in the region. I also interviewed representatives from the Ministry of External Relations, 
the Ministry of National Security, and the Ministry of Basic Education to understand the 
viewpoint of the Cameroonian government on the situation of refugees in the country.
 I recognize that, because my informants were predominantly people whose job it 
is to ensure the success of the refugee intervention in eastern Cameroon, I obtained what 
might appear to be a naively positive perspective on the situation. People who choose to 
work in this field might be naturally more optimistic, more likely to understand their 
work as a noble calling and to overlook problems that might exist (although, as I will 
discuss in Chapter Four, many of them also fall into this profession by chance or because 
it is the work that is available). Also, my informants, in striving to maintain the reputation 
of their organization or to remain on good terms with the government, might have been 
hesitant to share information about problems. I acknowledge that these factors may have 
influenced the perspective I present in this thesis. However, I also believe that an analysis 
of the successful elements I was able to document is valuable in that it yielded the 
insights on which I base my argument for this thesis.
 Language was an important consideration in conducting my interviews. French 
and English are both official languages in Cameroon; French, however, is predominant, 
with English spoken mainly in only two of Cameroon’s ten regions. As I am proficient in 
French, language was not a barrier for my research. Before beginning an interview, I 
asked my informant which language he or she preferred, and proceeded in that language. 
Though most of my interviews were conducted in French, I conducted interviews in 
English with a few Anglophone informants.
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 I obtained verbal or written informed consent from informants, depending on 
what they felt comfortable giving. Most of my informants granted permission to record 
interview, which I transcribed and coded to draw out themes. In my transcripts, as I do 
throughout this paper, I used pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of my informants. All 
interviews, transcripts, codes, and other information for the project were saved either on 
my personal computer or personal USB drive and I was careful not to leave any 
information open to others, again with a goal of protecting informants’ privacy. 
 In addition to interviews, I engaged in participant observation. Generally, 
participating in day-to-day life with my host family and friends I made in the city gave 
me a sense of the context in which the work of these organizations takes place. More 
specifically, I spent significant time in the NGOs’ offices and was able to observe the 
flow of everyday activity. While waiting for interviews, for example, I had the chance to 
sit in the organizations’ lobbies and watch people going about their work. Twice I was 
invited to dinner by several of my informants, French expatriates working for PU-AMI. 
These occasions gave me a chance to observe in a different context than that of the daily 
work environment. These dinners also provided insight into the humanitarian community 
in Bertoua and its social as well as professional elements.
 My research was also shaped by written sources. I reviewed various 
organizations’ promotional literature, such as brochures and pamphlets, which spoke to 
how these organizations present themselves to outsiders. The organizations’ websites 
provided additional information on their operational budgets and evaluations of projects. 
I consulted local media sources as well, which yielded local perspectives on changes in 
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Cameroon’s refugee law. I further supplemented my interview and observation data with 
library research on topics relating to Cameroon, the history of African refugee situations, 
and critical evaluations of humanitarian work, grounding my thesis in current theory and 
situating my own field research in its broader context. 
 Research for other projects has informed my analysis for this thesis. Since my 
sophomore year of college, when I decided I would study abroad in Cameroon, I have 
focused on the country for most of my research projects. I have investigated subjects 
ranging from political decentralization to the status of indigenous peoples in Cameroon to 
gender inequalities in education. Though not directly related to the refugee response, the 
research for these projects has deepened my grounding in the overall context of 
Cameroon. In Fall 2012 I also completed an internship with Opportunity Africa, a small 
non-profit organization based in Minnesota that provides scholarships to high school 
students in eastern Cameroon. My work with this organization deepened my 
understanding of the workings of the NGO community in the East. 
 Though I strove to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the situation in 
eastern Cameroon, I did encounter some limitations. One major hurdle involved gaining 
access to humanitarian organizations. Large international NGOs can be very bureaucratic; 
to conduct interviews, I needed permission from the proper authority, which often proved 
difficult to obtain. Once in the field, I had to adjust my plans and work with organizations 
that granted me access, which were not necessarily the organizations I originally had in 
mind. In the end, I found organizations that fit well with my original intentions for the 
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study, but I might have been able to gain more insider information from, for example, the 
UNHCR if I had been able to obtain official authorization.
 Another related limitation, also stemming from the bureaucratic nature of 
organizations, was that some of my informants were wary about having their identities 
linked to any information they might provide me and were thus unwilling to have our 
conversations recorded. This was especially true in my interviews with government 
officials and with the UNHCR representative. I compensated by taking copious notes 
during these interviews and reconstructing as complete a transcription as I could 
immediately following each interview. Although this was a challenge in some ways, it is 
also a strength that, by remaining flexible, I was able to interview people who were 
somewhat reluctant to talk about their involvement in the refugee response.
 Two final, related limitations involved my own time constraints and the busy lives 
of my informants. Four weeks is a very brief period to get to a research site, establish 
contact with informants, conduct interviews, analyze and organize data, and produce a 
report. Because my informants were often called unexpectedly into the field to deal with 
sudden developments, it was often a challenge to complete what I hoped to do. I was left 
with some remaining questions by the end of my month in Bertoua but tried to seek out 
the most detailed and rich information I could given the constraints on both sides. 
Conclusion
 Through my experiences in Cameroon and my investigation of other scholarly 
perspectives on the subject, I have developed the argument that the routinized refugee 
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response in eastern Cameroon, through successfully facilitated local integration, holds 
benefits for Cameroon’s process of nation-building. Chapter One has introduced my 
argument and outlined my theoretical framework and research methods. Chapter Two 
provides a regional history with an emphasis on long-established patterns of migration, 
exploring the interplay of these patterns with the “refugee” concept and with international 
regulations of movement. This chapter asserts that exploration of the local implications of 
international systems must be historically and geographically rooted in the local context. 
 Chapter Three examines the approach to refugee integration in eastern Cameroon, 
outlining the merits of a local integration model as opposed to refugee camps and the best  
practices that guide NGOs’ actions. This chapter argues that the professionalization of the 
refugee regime has allowed a routinization of responses in cases such as Cameroon. 
Chapter Four builds on this discussion to illustrate how the routinized nature of the 
response in Cameroon creates opportunities for nation-building for the Cameroonian 
state. This chapter, in highlighting the development impacts of humanitarian aid in 
eastern Cameroon, supports the argument that local integration of refugees interfaces 
with development processes to elevate Cameroon’s status in the order of nation-states. 
 Chapter Five examines the broader context of a shift toward an evaluation-based 
approach within the refugee regime. I reiterate my argument for the merits of studying 
cases of success and suggest some implications of this approach for anthropological 
contributions to policy-making.  Finally, Chapter Six summarizes my argument and the 
evidence used to support it, and raises some important avenues for future research. 
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Chapter Two
 Migration, State Borders, and Being Out-of-Bounds
 The categorical order of nation-states has become normative: “The world is 
organized as a set of mutually exclusive states...on which individuals normally depend 
for protection against violence, and for the maintenance of conditions that enable them to 
survive materially” (Zolberg et al 1989:33). The loss of that state protection creates an 
entry point for the refugee regime to work toward getting things back to “normal.” The 
state system has not always existed in its current form and remains fluid, as South 
Sudan’s 2011 independence illustrates. It is, however, the structure framing the processes 
I describe in this thesis. In this chapter I provide historical and political background on 
the states involved in the refugee crisis in eastern Cameroon and on the refugee regime 
that works in the liminal spaces between those states. Though many of the processes 
involved in these interactions originate at a macro level, a grounding in local histories 
and realities is crucial to understanding the impacts on the micro level. As I situate this 
thesis in its Cameroonian context, I underline how the constructed nature of the national 
order of things helps explain the political maneuvering that happens within it and the 
perceived need to hold it together in the face of threats such as that posed by refugees.
  
History of Cameroon
Unity in diversity, stability in centralization
Cameroon is often called “Africa in Miniature,” reflecting its diversity of 
landscapes (ranging from near-desert in the North to rainforest in the South) and peoples 
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(estimates of the number of ethnic groups range as high as 250). This name also reflects 
the multiplicity of historical influences that have shaped Cameroon’s journey toward its 
current social and political situation. Cameroon’s layers of diversity testify to the fact that 
it has not always existed as a state in its current form and that its present political realities 
include tensions stemming from the divergent backgrounds and needs of its people. 
 Though its emergence as a state in the modern sense came later, organized 
political entities have long existed in the region that is now Cameroon. The earliest 
traceable civilization in the region is the Sao, believed to have existed from the fifth to 
the eighth or ninth centuries C.E. (Fanso 1989:18). After the Sao, the Kanem Empire 
expanded to encompass most of present-day Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, 
extending east to the Middle Nile (Fanso 1989:20). Islam came to Cameroon under the 
Kanem Empire, and continues to hold great sway in the northern regions of Cameroon 
through the dominance of Lamidos, regional spiritual and political leaders. The Duala 
ethnic group developed a chamber of commerce to protect their economic interests 
against competition from German merchants before the arrival of colonialism (Gros 
2003:3). European exploration began in the 15th century with the Portuguese, who 
inspired Cameroon’s name by dubbing one of its rivers Rio dos Camaroes, River of 
Prawns (Gros 2003:1). The Trans-Atlantic slave trade, which began in the 16th century, 
also impacted Cameroon: some estimate that at least two and a half million people left 
Cameroon in the control of European slave traders (Fanso 1985:73; Gros 2003:1). 
 Although Cameroon is often described as having been colonized by the Germans 
and later by the British and French, in strict legal terms Cameroon was never a colony. As 
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the colonial period in Africa came into full swing, Cameroon became the German 
protectorate of Kamerun in 1884 with a treaty between the German envoy and two 
Cameroonian kings (Gros 2003:2). German rule was characterized by low levels of 
development and gradual expansion of power, mainly spurred by Christian missionaries 
(Gros 2003:2). Although Kamerun was not legally a colony, one could observe “all the 
visible imprints of early colonial rule: forced labor, dependence on a limited number of 
cash crops grown on large plantations, expropriation of African land, single-track 
railroads running from production centers in the interior to export points on the 
coast...etc.” (Gros 2003:2). The East, far from the coast and circumvented by these 
minimal colonial railroad systems, remained a marginal region, and to this day maintains 
a reputation as one of the least developed regions of Cameroon.
 With the outbreak of World War I, Germany lost its colonies and Kamerun 
became The Cameroons, a League of Nations mandate split between Britain and France. 
Britain and France invested significantly in the domain of industrial agriculture, making 
Cameroon dependent on export of cash crops (Gros 2003:5). These developments did 
affect the East, where the main modes of livelihood are cultivation of cash crops and 
commercial exploitation of timber (Neba 1987). Another problematic colonial legacy 
stems from the harsh repression of opposition to European rule (Gros 2003:7). Such 
suppression of nationalist tendencies has continued to the present, as “inflexibility, 
prevarication, obstruction, secrecy and violence have been the typical responses of 
Cameroon’s elite to popular demand for greater democracy, transparency, equitable 
wealth distribution and independence” (Gros 2003:7). 
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 This sort of political repression is often considered typical of the administration of 
Ahmadou Ahidjo, Cameroon’s first president upon independence. (Independence came in 
1960 for French Cameroun and 1961 for the British Cameroons, which then united with 
the formerly French regions to form a federal republic. Ahidjo abolished the federation in 
1972, creating a centralized republic). Although Ahidjo consolidated the diverse and 
historically differentiated regions of Cameroon, his authoritarian regime gained a 
reputation for human rights violations (Gros 2003:11). Ahidjo was replaced in 1982 by 
his successor, Paul Biya, widely thought to have been groomed as his replacement. Biya 
remains the president as of this writing. Although there was political liberalization under 
Biya beginning in the 1990s, with increased freedom of the press and institution of a 
multiparty system, many Cameroonians remain frustrated with the ongoing corruption 
and patron-clientism of the government (Fonchingong 2004; Nyamnjoh 1999). 
 In 2008, Biya changed the constitution to remove term limits and allow himself to 
remain in power (Sa’ah 2012). He subsequently went on to win the 2011 presidential 
election with 78 percent of the vote, and in 2012 celebrated his thirtieth year in power 
(Sa’ah 2012). This places him among Africa’s longest-reigning leaders, second only to 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, Jose Eduardo dos Santos of 
Angola, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (Sa’ah 2012). Though Biya has maintained his 
position through supposedly legal democratic elections, there have been questions about 
corruption since the 1992 election, which many believe was in truth won by opposition 
candidate John Fru Ndi. Reformers have little recourse when, despite supposed progress 
in rights to free speech, citizens can still be arrested and imprisoned for comments made 
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in their personal lives (UN News Service 2012). Cameroonians are frustrated by this 
atmosphere and by promises of change made but not kept. However, until now the strong, 
centralized government has kept these tensions in check; this government, though 
repressive to its citizens in many ways, has also guaranteed the stable environment that 
enables the successful refugee response. 
   
Legacies of fluidity and mobility
 Though Cameroon has, in the years since independence, worked toward 
conforming to an international ideal of statehood within the borders defined at the Berlin 
Conference in 1885, the region that is now Cameroon has a long history of migration and 
intermingling of peoples. Recent flows of refugees from the CAR to Cameroon are not an 
anomaly; they are tied to political and migratory legacies of the region. Early population 
displacements in the region can be traced to the Bantu migrations, which began around 
1000 B.C.E. (Fanso 1989:10). These migrations involved movements of Bantu-speaking 
peoples from a place of origin in northwest Africa to their current locations across the 
continent. Although facts on such ancient migrations are difficult to pinpoint, several 
leading scholars have identified an area encompassing parts of contemporary Cameroon 
and Nigeria as the starting place for the Bantu migrations (Fanso 1989:10). From 
prehistoric times, then, Cameroon has been a major locus of migration.
 Migration patterns did not involve only migration outward from Cameroon to 
other parts of Africa; there was much migration internal to the region as well. Prior to and 
during the nineteenth century, there was significant southward migration in Cameroon, 
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with groups such as the Tikar, the Nso, the Bamum, the Kom, the Fang, and the Bafut 
moving south and establishing new settlements (Ngoh 1996:1). Southward movement 
stemmed also from raids by nomadic pastoral groups from the north, including the 
Chamba and the Fulani (Ngoh 1996:1). There was also eastward migration of the Bayang 
people (Ngoh 1996:2). These migrations happened for a variety of reasons, from 
competition for land and resources to campaigns to spread Islam southward to, 
eventually, arrival of Europeans and the slave trade (Ngoh 1996).
 One significant migratory trend during Cameroon’s precolonial history which has 
bearing for this thesis is the “international” nature of population movements. Ekoi 
peoples migrated from what is now Nigeria into what is now Cameroon, and Tikar 
peoples migrated in the opposite direction (Ngoh 1996:2). The nomadic Fulani ranged 
between northern Nigeria, Cameroon, and other parts of equatorial Africa (Ngoh 1996:2). 
There were migratory ties between Cameroon and eastern Sudan (Ngoh 1996:2). And, 
most significantly for this thesis, there were ongoing migrations of Gbaya peoples 
between what is now Cameroon and what is now the Central African Republic (Ngoh 
1996:2). It was only with the imposition of the current national borders in 1885 that these 
population movements became international migrations subject to regulations associated 
with the crossing of borders. Before that formalization of territories, such migrations 
were a normal, integral part of the political and economic landscape of the region.
 The history and current situation of Cameroon’s nomadic peoples has been 
extensively studied, especially as it relates to ideas of national belonging and nation-
building (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005; Davis 1995; Mouiche 2011; Nyamnjoh and 
28
Rowlands 1998; Pelican 2008; Pelican 2009). The way these histories tie into local 
discourses about autochthony and belonging, and to international discourses on 
indigeneity and national identity, are highly relevant to any discussion of migration and 
refugee status. In Cameroon in particular, these questions are particularly interesting in 
that refugees arriving from the CAR are from historically nomadic ethnic groups and are 
joining ethnically similar communities on the other side of a national border. Though I 
touch on these themes several times throughout this thesis, because of the constraints of 
my project I was unable to seek out community-level perspectives on refugees’ impacts 
on local ideas about belonging; thus, when I refer to nation-building, I am regarding it 
from a government-policy perspective rather than one of local discourses of belonging.
 At the conclusion of World War II and through independence processes across 
Africa, migration became more regulated. The legal category of “refugee” was coming 
into common use in international law and institutional frameworks for identifying and 
assisting refugees were developing. Population movements continued, but now crossing a 
border for certain reasons could move one legally into the category of “refugee.” A 
“refugee” was defined in the 1950 UNHCR Statute and the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees as “any person who is outside their country of origin 
and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account 
of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular group, or political opinion.” This definition was originally 
restricted to people fleeing persecution owing to events occurring before 1951 (Goodwin-
Gill 2008:3). Later, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees widened the 
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definition to include later refugee-producing situations. Other refugee definitions, such as 
that of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), expanded the definition of “refugee” 
even further; the OAU definition includes those displaced by “external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order” in addition to 
persecution (OAU 1969:5). All of these foundational documents contributed to the 
construction of a legal category of “refugee” by the international community.
 Even as the refugee concept gained traction internationally, and though Cameroon 
is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention as well as the 1969 OAU Convention, it took 
some time for Cameroon to incorporate the legal category of “refugee” into its domestic 
law. Law Number 1990/043 of 1990, which defined the conditions of admissibility, 
residence, and leave of foreigners in Cameroon, does not mention refugees at all. It does, 
however, assert the inviolability of Cameroon’s borders and emphasize the necessity of 
proper documentation for any movements into and out of Cameroon, contrasting with the 
fluid mobility that existed before the institution of national borders. A later law, Law 
Number 1997/012 of 1997, does mention refugees but states only that a refugee card will 
be delivered to people who qualify for asylum. It was not until the passage of the 2005 
Law on the Status of Refugees in Cameroon that refugees as a category received 
extensive attention in Cameroonian law (Loi numero 2005/006). 
 The 2005 law uses the expanded refugee definition of the OAU to include those 
who flee  due to violence as well as persecution. The law also enumerates grants rights 
such as non-discrimination, free practice of religion, ownership of property, education, 
lodging, and movement to refugees as long as they respect Cameroon’s laws. Finally, the 
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law envisions the establishment of two commissions, one to decide on the eligibility of 
applicants for refugee status and another to process appeals. These commissions would 
replace the UNHCR in conducting refugee status determinations and in providing 
refugees with identification documentation. However, the 2005 law did not launch the 
actual creation of these commissions, and since its passage the UNHCR has continued in 
its role of determining refugee status.
 Finally, though, in November of 2011, a decree of application for the 2005 law 
was signed which outlined the process for establishing the commissions. From the 
signing of the decree, the government was given six months to make the commissions 
operational. At the time of my research, four months later, progress had been made but 
the commissions were not yet active. The government representative responsible for 
refugee issues explained to me that “En ce moment on a toutes les commissions qui sont 
déjà pourvues, les administrations représentées dans ces commissions ont déjà désigné 
leurs membres. Une fois qu’on aura constaté la composition des deux commissions, on va 
prêter serment auprès du tribunal de grand instance de Yaoundé. Et après, on va pouvoir 
travailler”3 (Charles, interview 04/02/12). He was optimistic about the six-month 
deadline. Outside observers, such as my informant from the UNHCR, were more 
skeptical: “On se rend compte que le temps est en train de passer, et pour tout accomplir 
en 6 mois, ça va être un peu difficile. Donc le HCR continue avec ses activités, et on 
espère que, progressivement, les commissions vont commencer a travailler comme c’est 
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3 “Right now we have both commissions already provided for, the administrations represented on these 
commissions have already designated their members. Once we’ve verified the composition of the two 
commissions, we will testify before the supreme court in Yaoundé. After that, we will be able to work.”
prévu dans la loi.”4 (Isaac, interview 04/16/12). This will be a development to continue 
monitoring as Cameroon claims more autonomy in determining refugee status. 
 The influx of Central African refugees which forms the basis for this thesis is 
certainly not the first instance of forced migration into Cameroon in recent history. 
Armed conflict in neighboring Chad in 1979, for example, prompted an outflow of 
between 200,000 and 300,000 refugees, most of whom fled to Cameroon (Nobel 
1982:277). Refugee influxes from Chad have been an ongoing occurrence in Cameroon, 
with an additional 40,000 refugees arriving in 1990 and  58,000 more fleeing violence 
between government troops and rebel forces in 2008 (Rene 2009:5). Conflict in Nigeria 
in 2001 spurred an influx of about 17,000 refugees into Cameroon (Rene 2009:6). Even 
in the absence of a domestic refugee law, Cameroon followed its obligations under 
international law by providing temporary asylum and promoting voluntary repatriation, in 
keeping with broader trends in the region (Nobel 1982:267). Today, according to 
UNHCR statistics, Cameroon hosts not only Central African refugees but also refugees 
from Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, and various other countries. Cameroon’s reputation as a 
politically stable and hospitable country, its central location and shared borders with 
several neighboring states, its bilingualism, and cross-border ethnic ties between groups 
all make Cameroon a popular destination for those seeking refuge. 
 The question of cross-border ethnic ties is interesting in relation to the Mbororo 
refugees from the CAR. The Mbororo, a historically nomadic pastoral people, inhabit 
both Cameroon and the Central African Republic. The institution of national borders 
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4 “We realize that time is passing and to accomplish everything in six months might be a little bit difficult. 
So the HCR continues with its activities, and we hope that, progressively, the commissions will begin to 
work as foreseen in the law.”
modified Mbororo traditional patterns of migration by creating boundaries which 
theoretically require additional legal permission to cross. However, as recently as 2007 
the African Union convened a fact-finding mission to investigate the “problem” of 
Mbororo migration in the Democratic Republic of Congo, CAR, the Sudans, and 
Cameroon (African Union 2008). This mission determined that “in all seasons and socio-
political events, groups move with their livestock from one country to another” (African 
Union 2008:6-7). Migration has continued into recent times as a reality for many 
Mbororo, but the current refugee situation is transforming that reality. Fear of insecurity 
sparked by the refugee influx “has led the Government of Cameroon to create a special 
unit to secure the border with CAR” (African Union 2008:7). The refugee influx is 
leading Cameroon to re-imagine its relationship to migration as it strengthens its control 
at the borders of its territory.
Conflict in the Central African Republic
Tthe borders currently in place in Africa may be recent human constructions, 
but they still hold power in shaping relationships between individuals and states. To 
understand the implications of the international response to Central African refugees in 
Cameroon, then, it is not enough to examine what is happening on the Cameroonian side 
of the border. The events precipitating Central Africans’ flight are also part of the story. 
The ongoing (as of this writing) conflict in the CAR began in 2001 following 
an unsuccessful coup attempt by former president Kolingba against then-president Ange-
Félix Patassé (MRGI 2008). Following the coup attempt, Army Chief of Staff François 
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Bozizé, a Kolingba supporter, fled to Chad along with part of the army, where he 
regrouped and waited for a chance to try again (MRGI 2008). Bozizé launched 
subsequent coup attempts in 2002 and 2003, taking possession of several northern towns; 
the Patassé government sought assistance from the Mouvement pour la Liberation du 
Congo (MLC) in repelling these attacks (MRGI 2008). The government and MLC forces 
have allegedly committed war crimes in attempts to recapture northern towns; thus, 
people in these towns have suffered at the hands of the rebel forces led by Bozizé and of 
the government and the MLC (MRGI 2008). The upheaval and general lack of security 
have resulted in increased circulation of small arms and a lack of economic opportunities, 
leading to an increase in banditry (UNHCR 2011:12). Another player in the conflict is the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group that originated in Uganda in the 1980s but 
has since spread to the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the CAR. 
Instability has allowed the LRA to gain a foothold in the eastern part of the CAR, where 
it has perpetrated human rights violations against civilians (UNHCR 2011:12). 
 All in all, conflict has made life highly unstable for Central Africans since 2001, 
particularly for northerners. A UNHCR report from 2007 estimated that, at the time, more 
than 290,000 people had been uprooted from their homes, with 212,000 remaining 
internally displaced and 80,000 fleeing to Chad, Cameroon, or Sudan (UNHCR 2007b). 
Some refugees have also made their way to Western countries, primarily to France and 
the United States (UNHCR 2005). Although this diaspora is unquestionably an important 
facet of the Central African refugee story, further investigation of the experience of this 
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community, and of any links it may have to Central African refugees still in Africa or to 
those internally displaced within the CAR, is beyond the scope of this study.
 Those who have fled the CAR are frustrated with what seems an arbitrary case of 
being stuck in the wrong place at the wrong time: “‘The usual pattern is that rebels attack 
key towns in the north, the government soldiers take them back and retaliate on the 
surrounding villages...We, the civilians, are in the middle and we are paying the 
price’” (UNHCR 2007b). However, factors of ethnicity are also involved, meaning that 
the violence is not strictly arbitrary. The nomadic Mbororo living in northern CAR were 
originally of Chadian origin, and although they have lived in CAR for generations and 
hold Central African citizenship, they are “frequently referred to as ‘foreigners’” (MRGI 
2008). Bozizé’s flight to Chad heightened the distrust, as Chadians in CAR were 
suspected of colluding (MRGI 2008). Mbororo pastoralists are also resented for their 
relative wealth in cattle, making them prime targets for bandits (MRGI 2008). Child 
abduction is rampant: “the bandits, roaming along roads and trails, kidnap children and 
demand crippling ransoms from families. They have to sell valuable cattle to raise the 
money” (UNHCR 2007a). By the time Mbororo refugees arrive in Cameroon, they have 
often lost everything and “are in an extremely precarious situation’” (MRGI 2008). 
 The Cameroonian government estimates that in 2012 Cameroon hosted nearly 
104,000 refugees, with around 80,000, mostly from the CAR, located in the East region 
(Charles, interview 04/02/12). Because Cameroon is reputed to be a stable and 
welcoming country, it is a popular destination for refugees; because the East region 
shares a border with the CAR, there are already shared languages and ethnic 
35
characteristics between arriving refugees and their host communities, which facilitates 
their integration (factors promoting successful integration are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Three). This integration is facilitated by a refugee regime that has developed 
professional strategies for managing refugee flows. In addition to Cameroon and the 
CAR, this international regime is an important player in the political negotiations that 
surround the presence of refugees in the East. 
Development of the International Refugee Regime
 The refugee regime brings with it international perspectives and resources that 
affect the unfolding of a crisis. To understand the politics involved in a refugee response, 
it is crucial to recognize that the regime is not always as apolitical and altruistic as its 
characterization. These international actors may bring relief to those in need, but they are 
also involved in maintaining the normality of the national order of things by assuring that 
the border in question and the nation-states to each side remain intact. For these reasons, 
an understanding of the emergence and development of the international refugee regime 
is important to the analysis that follows.
 A concept of humanitarianism has long existed internationally. Gary Bass 
highlights early cases such as international activism against the slave trade and 
nineteenth-century interventions to stop oppression by the Ottoman Empire and Naples 
(Bass 2008:12, 17). However, the history of the modern refugee regime begins in 1921 
with the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This body is the clearest 
precursor to the UNHCR, which is the shaping force in the refugee regime’s activities in 
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Cameroon today. In the early years of organized humanitarian efforts, main causes of 
refugee movements included the breakup of major European empires during the 1920s 
and disinheritance of certain groups with the rise of fascism in Europe during the 1930s 
(Loescher 2001:22-29). These refugee crises were handled individually, with a separate 
apparatus set up for each case. For example, in 1920 Fridtjof Nansen was appointed High 
Commissioner for Refugees with responsibility solely for Russian refugees; in 1933 the 
League of Nations established the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany 
(Loescher 2001:24-30). This approach suggests a conception of refugee crises as 
temporary, solvable, and spontaneous rather than systemic, recurring realities.
 The international community continued to think of refugee situations as 
temporary through the end of World War II. The war left millions displaced and in need 
of assistance, and both the newly founded United Nations and a plethora of fledgling 
voluntary agencies sprang into action to reestablish normalcy: “Relief and rehabilitation 
in Europe were to be for the short term only. Once people were repatriated and adequate 
resources for rebuilding were provided, it was widely assumed that Western European 
states could stand on their own feet again and deal with their own problems” (Loescher 
2001:35). The UNHCR as we know it today emerged from this context of upheaval in 
Europe and reacted to specifically European problems. The 1950 Statute and the 1951 
Convention, which continue to guide the work of the UNHCR today, were born of this 
context; their narrow definitions of what constitutes a refugee had to be expanded in the 
1967 Protocol. The UNHCR’s scope has been further broadened by the “good offices 
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mandate,” which gives the High Commissioner leeway to assist in a wider range of 
situations which the UNHCR has the competency to handle. 
 During the Cold War, the refugee regime did not escape entanglement in the 
political tensions of the times. “Because refugees constituted visible rejection of their 
domestic policies, Communist authorities lashed out at the receiving states and refused to 
cooperate with the UNHCR” (Loescher 2001:54). For similar reasons, Western 
governments “encouraged the flow from East to West in order to weaken their ideological 
rivals and gain political legitimacy” (Loescher 2001:54) Later, with the shift to proxy 
wars in the developing world, aid to refugees became linked to foreign policy and 
security concerns. For both sides, providing assistance to refugees seemed a good way to 
ingratiate themselves with newly independent countries and to promote their own 
ideologies (Loescher 2001:122-123). In these proxy-wars-by-humanitarian-assistance 
“the developed states were not in danger of confronting masses of Third World 
arrivals” (Loescher 2001:123). When the refugees involved were from developing 
countries rather than Communist ones, Western governments preferred sending aid from 
afar. Refugee interventions in the developing world became a way to contain unrest in 
regions far from developed countries’ doorsteps. 
 Although countries in the global North were largely responsible for the creation of 
the refugee regime, in a post-Cold War context these countries have increasingly 
established restrictions on immigration and asylum which have prevented refugees from 
penetrating their borders (Keely 2001). Keely suggests a parallel development of two 
refugee regimes: one in the global North, which retained the original spirit of the 1951 
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Convention and concerned itself primarily with refugees from Communist countries; and 
another in the global South, which dealt with the complex political consequences of 
decolonization and expanded beyond the Convention definition to deal with a wider 
range of scenarios of migration and displacement. Post-Cold War, admitting refugees was 
no longer in the political interest of Northern countries, which instead turned to the 
refugee regime as a mechanism for managing refugee flows, containing them in the 
global South. As it deals with situations that the global North has little interest in 
handling, the UNHCR has become a more powerful and autonomous actor and has 
“expanded its services to a much wider range of people who [are] in need of assistance 
including returnees, internally displaced people, war-affected populations, the victims of 
mass expulsions, and unsuccessful asylum-seekers...Consequently, the UNHCR [has] 
expanded from a refugee organization into a more broadly-based operational agency 
driven by emergencies” (Loescher 2001:14-15). 
Conclusion
 Global systems of governance such as the refugee regime organize around the 
ideal of the nation-state as distinct, discrete, and sovereign, even when reality does not 
match this ideal. As the context in which the processes described in this thesis unfold, 
central Africa’s long history of diversity and migration is important for understanding the 
constructed nature of the integrated, unified nation ideal. Because that ideal informs how 
we understand the normal order, we create systems for maintaining and reinforcing it. 
Refugees, in their statelessness, fall outside of that ideal; the refugee regime, in an almost 
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ritual manner, uses these abnormal circumstances to reinforce the norm (Gluckman 
1967). As it defines refugees’ status, provides them with papers, protects their rights, and 
seeks “permanent solutions” to re-incorporate them into the system, the regime provides 
refugees alternatives to existing in the liminal space between states. In so doing, it 
reaffirms the nation-state system as “natural” and “normal,” and provides cooperating 
states an opportunity to reinforce their position within that system. The current political 
realities described in this chapter mean that when violence and upheaval on one side of a 
border push people to the other side of that border, it sets in motion a chain of events that 
treat the situation as outside of the norm and in need of corrective action. 
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Chapter Three
 Local Integration, Humanitarian Norms, and Keys to Cameroonian Success
 What about the refugee intervention in Cameroon has allowed it to move forward 
smoothly where other interventions have encountered complications? Part of the answer, 
as described in Chapter Two, is the context of stability provided by Cameroon’s 
formidable government. NGOs can implement their programs without worrying about 
their own safety or the possibility of violence spilling over from the CAR. Within this 
context of security, however, decisions made by humanitarian and governmental actors 
also influence how the intervention plays out. In my research, two elements emerged as 
central to the overall trend of success in the refugee response in Cameroon.
 The first of these is the method of accommodating refugees. Refugee camps are 
common in many refugee situations; of the four crises the UNHCR identified as the most 
pressing at the end of 2012 - in Mali, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Syria - all had prompted creation of refugee camps in neighboring countries 
(UNHCR 2012). In Cameroon, by contrast, refugees are integrated directly into 
communities. Successful integration, though not without drawbacks, avoids many of the 
problems associated with refugee camps, creating the potential for greater success in 
responding to the needs of refugees. Cameroon meets the criteria identified by scholars 
such as Sara Feldman and Jeff Crisp (discussed in detail later in this chapter) as necessary 
for a successful integration effort, and humanitarian workers on the ground attest to 
integration’s success. The first part of this chapter examines in further detail the factors 
that have made successful integration possible in Cameroon. 
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 The second element contributing to success is the role played by a 
professionalized refugee regime in a routinized refugee situation. Outside of the 
international spotlight and without needing to negotiate around intervening military 
forces, guerrilla fighters, or competing political factions, NGOs can implement their 
programs according to humanitarian principles and best practices in a way that is often 
impossible in other contexts. As humanitarianism has evolved, certain ideas and 
approaches have gained legitimacy. These ideas include traditional humanitarian 
principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence (Terry 2002) as well as 
certain best practices that surfaced repeatedly in my interviews, including cultural 
sensitivity, community participation, and financial accountability. These principles and 
practices are ingrained in NGO cultures; they are a lens through which humanitarian 
workers such as my informants understand their role in the situation. The second part of 
this chapter examines the practices that surfaced as most important in guiding my 
informants on the ground in Cameroon. 
 Fiona Terry (2002) and Mary Anderson (1999) both analyze humanitarian 
intervention at an operational level, scrutinizing the actions of aid organizations in crises 
around the world. Both authors recognize the dangers of aid and acknowledge that 
humanitarianism can cause harm, even prolonging the conflicts it seeks to alleviate. 
Ultimately, however, both scholars affirm that action, despite the risks, is preferable to 
inaction: Terry promotes imperfect solutions for “a second-best world” while Anderson 
argues that “it is a moral and logical fallacy to conclude that because aid can do harm, a 
decision not to give aid would do no harm” (Anderson 1999:2; Terry 2002:216). As I 
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argue that the routinized response in Cameroon involves innovative solutions for 
addressing past problems, I align myself with these scholars’ conclusions. This analysis 
of efforts to build a better humanitarian model lays the groundwork both for 
understanding the broader development impacts of humanitarian aid, discussed in 
Chapter Four, and Chapter Five’s discussion of how anthropology can contribute to the 
refugee regime’s ongoing efforts to work toward better solutions for doing no harm.
Making Local Integration Work in Eastern Cameroon
The Great Camp Debate
 Refugee camps “easily qualify as the most conspicuous element of refugee 
assistance”--they dominate media coverage of refugee emergencies around the world, 
shaping our notions of what such emergencies look like (Schmidt 2003). Because of their 
prevalence as a response to refugee situations, camps seem like a logical measure: they 
contain a refugee influx to prevent it from overwhelming local infrastructures, streamline 
the provision of aid, and make people easier to track, supervise, and repatriate once 
things calm down. Sometimes, though, host countries choose not to create camps. In any 
crisis, local integration happens for those refugees who remain outside of official avenues 
of assistance and protection. In Cameroon, however, it is intentionally facilitated by the 
UNHCR and partner NGOs. The choice, and success, of integration as a response to the 
refugee situation contributes to the beneficial effects of humanitarian aid on Cameroon’s 
development, a topic explored in Chapter Four.  
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 Humanitarian and scholarly communities increasingly recognize that the vision of 
a temporary response to refugee movements is unrealistic. Most of the world’s refugees 
are in “protracted refugee situations,” defined as populations of 10,000 or more restricted 
to a camp for five years or longer (Feldman 2007:52). Large concentrations of people, 
over time, create health risks and strain on the local environment; life in camps 
undermines social patterns and makes it difficult for refugees to interact with local 
communities; in several cases, refugee camps have become hotbeds of violent activity 
(Harrell-Bond 1994:15-16). Camps also limit residents’ freedom of movement and access 
to outside economic opportunities, creating the risk of dependency on aid; because camps 
are often on marginal land that was not in use for other purposes, opportunities for self-
sufficiency are limited (Feldman 2007:52). Despite these recognized drawbacks, camps 
remain the dominant framework for dealing with refugee situations around the world. 
 Practitioners have attempted many alternatives to refugee camps. In Africa in 
particular, between the 1960s and the 1980s many countries granted refugee communities 
tracts of land on which to create their own new settlements (Crisp 2004:4). These 
settlements were deemed unsuccessful because they were “unable to achieve or sustain 
economic self-sufficiency and many refugees [were] not integrated into their host 
countries” (Clark and Stein 1990). Perhaps due to the perceived failure of that approach, 
local settlement became a less popular solution in African crises after the 1980s, and 
refugee camps became the norm (Crisp 2004:4). 
 Ideas about the viability of local settlements reemerged in models such as 
Development Assisted Integration (DAI), based on direct integration into host 
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communities (Feldman 2007:50). “DAI refers to the coordination of refugee assistance 
with local economic development so that those communities that host refugees can 
receive additional funding for enabling refugees to settle amongst locals” (Feldman 
2007:50). this approach has succeeded in places such as Guinea, where throughout the 
1990s the government and UNHCR reinforced local infrastructure and services to benefit 
communities already hosting self-settled refugees (Van Damme 1995:361). As a 
consistent solution, however, integration has not yet gained widespread acceptance. 
Eastern Cameroon thus provides insight into a search for innovative solutions within the 
refugee regime; in a context where other factors are stable enough to allow routine 
operating procedures to be followed, the regime can try and perfect new approaches.  
Meeting the conditions for success
 In addition to the context of stability, several other factors make eastern 
Cameroon an ideal location for integration. Scholar Sara Feldman suggests five 
preconditions that foster success of local settlement as an alternative to refugee camps: 
1) the refugee’s right to freedom of movement and right to work are respected 
by the host government to some degree, 2) the necessary inputs are available 
for the kind of economic activity in which the refugees will be engaged (such 
as arable land or job training), 3) the host government supports and is 
committed to the effort, 4) locals benefit as well as refugees, and 5) there is a 
place for the refugees in the local economy. [Feldman 2007:66]
Jeff Crisp adds to this framework by suggesting that local settlement is most likely to 
succeed when  refugees share a language, culture, or ethnic origin with the host 
community (Crisp 2004:6). All of these conditions are in place in eastern Cameroon, 
making it an ideal location to examine the success of a local-integration model. 
45
 Refugees’ rights to freedom of movement and work in Cameroon are protected by 
the 2005 refugee law, which states that “Pour l’exercice d’une activité professionnelle 
salariée ou non, et sans exonération d’impôts et de taxes...les personnes reconnues 
comme réfugiées sont assimilées aux nationaux”5 and also protects freedom of circulation 
and the right to obtain identity and travel documents (Loi numero 2005/006). Though 
there have been several cited cases of authorities refusing to recognize refugees’ 
identification documentation, and thus curtailing their rights (USCRI 2008), authorities 
recognize that refugees hold these rights, at least in theory. In an interview with two 
employees of the Ministry of National Security, one man asked whether refugees in 
Cameroon had the right to engage in economic activities. The other replied, “Ils doivent 
vivre, n’est-ce pas? Mais pour s’installer, ils ont besoin de terre, et les autochtones ne 
veulent pas la donner. Donc il y a des conflits là-dessus”6 (Quentin, interview 4/25/12). 
Since agriculture is the predominant form of economic activity in the East, this question 
of access to land is crucial. Thus, though refugees’ right to freedom of movement and 
work is recognized by the Cameroonian government, the exercise of those rights is 
sometimes curtailed, speaking to the second of Feldman’s criteria.
 The main economic input for agriculture is arable land. The East, as the least 
densely populated region in Cameroon, has land to spare, but gaining access to land is not 
always easy for refugees. Several NGOs in the East are working on this issue. PU-AMI, 
for example, “a négocié avec les populations et les autorités locales pour qu’ils [les 
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5 “For the exercise of professional activity, salaried or not, and without exemption from taxes, persons 
recognized as refugees are assimilated with nationals.”
6 “They have to live, don’t they? But to settle in, they need land, and the local people don’t want to give it 
to them. So there are conflicts around this issue.” 
réfugiés] aient accès à la terre, et on a commencé à faire des distributions de semences”7 
(Dominique, interview 4/6/12). PU-AMI also trains refugees in agricultural techniques. 
“C’était des éleveurs, donc on a dû vraiment leur faire des formations pour en faire des 
agriculteurs”8 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). The assistance of NGOs such as PU-AMI 
helps refugees negotiate both the question of access to economic inputs and of finding a 
place for themselves in the local economy.
 In Cameroon, the question of host government support for refugee assistance 
effort is the most ambiguous of Feldman’s criteria. Certain officials, such as those from 
the Ministry of National Security, were frustrated by the presence of refugees. They cited 
increased instability in the region and complained that international law obligated them to 
accommodate refugees, no matter their preference. Others, such as a representative from 
the Ministry of Basic Education, seemed more neutral; while recognizing the importance 
of providing assistance to vulnerable refugee populations, he also described the challenge 
their presence posed for already-crowded schools. However, the representative from the 
Ministry of External Relations, who is in charge of the national office of refugee issues, 
was very firm in his support for refugee assistance efforts: 
 J’ai compris que c’est des personnes vulnérables et qui ont besoin de beaucoup 
 d’aide.  Quand vous allez dans des pays comme le Rwanda ou même à l’est de 
 Cameroun, vous voyez des gens qui vous disent que ça fait 3 jours, 4 jours, 5 
 jours qu’ils n’ont pas mangé ou nourri les enfants, ça vous fait compatir à leurs 
 souffrances. Et puis, personne n’est à l’abri de cette situation. Au Cameroun, ici, 
 on peut connaître la situation que connaît le Tchad ou le Centre Afrique. C’est 
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7 “negotiated with the populations and the local authorities for the refugees to have access to land, and 
we’ve started distributing seeds.” 
8 “They were herders, so we really had to train them to make them into farmers.”
 pour ça que nous, au Cameroun, on prend, avec beaucoup d’attention, cette 
 question des réfugiés.9 [Charles, interview 4/2/12]
Such enthusiasm from the govenrment official overseeing cooperation with the UNHCR 
speaks to the prevailing stance of the government regarding refugee relief efforts.
 Mutual benefit for locals and refugees is central to integration in the East. This 
possibility was, in fact, cited by the representative from the Ministry of External 
Relations as one reason for avoiding the creation of refugee camps: “Quand les gens sont 
confinés dans un camp, on voit des camions qui arrivent distribuer la nourriture, mais pas 
aux autochtones. Les nationaux peuvent se dire, ‘Pourquoi est-ce qu’on nourrisse ceux-là 
et pas nous?’”10 (Charles, interview 4/2/12). Including local communities in projects was 
an adjustment that PU-AMI had to make based on experience: 
 C’est vrai que le Cameroun est un terre d’accueil, mais les camerounais dans les 
 villages ne comprenaient pas que quand les ONG arrivent distribuer les vivres, 
 c’est seulement pour les réfugiés. Mais c’est ça le budget du HCR ! Mais ça a créé 
 des difficultés avec l’intégration. Maintenant on inclut un certain nombre de 
 camerounais dans nos programmes pour les réfugiés, pour établir plus de 
 confiance dans les communautés.11 [Laurent, interview 4/18/12] 
Local integration of refugees makes expansion of aid to Cameroonians more possible: 
aiding only the refugees in a given town would be difficult. Integration also opens 
communities to aid from development organizations rather than only from refugee-
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9 “I understood that these are vulnerable people who need help. When you go to countries like Rwanda or 
even in eastern Cameroon, you see people who tell you that it’s been 3 days, 4 days, 5 days that they 
haven’t eaten or fed their children, that makes you sympathize with their suffering. And then, no one is safe 
from this situation. In Cameroon, here, we might experience what Chad or the CAR have experienced. 
That’s why we, in Cameroon, pay a lot of attention to this question of refugees.” 
10 “When people are confined in a camp, you see trucks that come to distribute food, but not to the local 
people. The nationals might ask themselves, ‘Why are they feeding them and not us?’” 
11 “It’s true that Cameroon is a land of welcome, but Cameroonians in the villages didn’t understand that 
when the NGOs arrived to distribute provisions, it was only for the refugees. But that’s the budget of the 
HCR! But that created difficulties with integration. Now we include a certain number of Cameroonians in 
our programs for refugees, to establish more confidence in the communities.” 
focused organizations. This is illustrated by the two main organizations I researched: 
though one was focused on refugees, and the other on development efforts, both 
collaborated with the UNHCR to assist communities hosting refugees. The next chapter 
expands on this discussion of the impacts of integration on local development processes. 
 Finally, there is the question of cultural similarity between refugee and host 
communities.  Because refugees are mainly moving directly over the border between the 
CAR and Cameroon, they are settling into communities of similar ethnic groups. “Les 
réfugiés ont été intégrés dans des villages de leur propre ethnie. Donc les Mbororo sont 
dans des villages Mbororo, les Gbaya sont dans des villages Gbaya”12 (Dominique, 
interview 4/6/12). This ethnic congruity was cited frequently by my informants as a 
major reason for the success of integration. “Quand vous regardez les réfugiés Mbororo 
qui viennent du Centrafrique, on a également des populations Mbororo camerounaises. Il 
n’y a que les frontières qui les ont séparés. Donc ils sont avec leurs frères”13 (Charles, 
interview 4/2/12). The refugees integrated so well, in fact, that the Ministry of National 
Security complained about the impossibility of separating the two: 
 Ce qui rend difficile ce tâche [de sécuriser le pays] pour nous est que les réfugiés 
 centrafricaines sont les mêmes peuples que les communautés camerounaises 
 qu’ils rejoignent - Gbaya, Mbororo, etc. Ils causent les mêmes langues. Donc 
 c’est très difficile de savoir qui est un réfugié - les populations réfugiées se 
 confondent avec les populations hôtes.14 [Quentin, interview 4/25/12] 
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12 “The refugees were integrated into villages of their own ethnicity. So the Mbororo are in Mbororo 
villages, the Gbaya are in Gbaya villages.” 
13 “When you see Mbororo refugees who come from the CAR, we also have Cameroonian Mbororo 
populations. There’s nothing but a border separating them. So they are with their brothers.”
14 “What makes this task of securing the country so difficult for us is that the Central African refugees are 
the same peoples as the Cameroonian communities they’re joining - Gbaya, Mbororo, etc. They speak the 
same languages. So it’s very difficult to know who is a refugee - the refugee populations become confused 
with the host populations.” 
Though local integration caused some problems in the eyes of security personnel, for 
those working with refugees in a humanitarian capacity this seamlessness of integration 
was a sign that integration was the right choice in this context.
 The conditions, as defined by scholars who have observed other integration 
efforts, thus exist for the success of integration in Cameroon. My informants saw how 
this benefits refugees. “Nous pensons que, quand les réfugiés sont confinés dans les 
camps, leur intégration se fait plus lent. On a donc pensé que pour que les réfugiés se 
trouvent bien intégrés, se trouve en symbiose avec les nationaux, il fallait qu’on ne les 
met pas dans les camps”15 (Charles, interview 4/2/12). The choice to try integration rather 
than camps in eastern Cameroon suggests a growing sensitivity within the regime to the 
need to tailor solutions to the local context in order to make them as effective as possible.
Humanitarian Principles and Best Practices
Shifts in the culture of the refugee regime
 Simply because the preconditions for success are met, however, does not 
necessarily mean that success will be achieved. Choices NGOs make in creating and 
implementing their programs shape what success looks like within this context of 
integration. These choices also reflect cultural shifts in the regime. The attitudes and 
principles that guided my informants’ work were not founded on idealistic notions of 
altruism but rather on best practices developed through decades of experience with 
successes and failures in other crises. Documentation and analysis of problems that have 
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15 “We think that, when refugees are confined in camps, they integrate more slowly. We therefore thought 
that for the refugees to truly be integrated, to be in symbiosis with the nationals, it was necessary to not put 
them in camps.”
arisen in past refugee interventions, by NGOs as well as by scholars, have helped build a 
better approach, which is now contributing to the success in Cameroon.
 My experience with NGOs in eastern Cameroon suggests that the refugee regime 
is responding to past critiques by adapting its institutional culture. Practices of 
collaboration between humanitarian actors, cultural sensitivity, community participation, 
financial accountability and transparency, and close monitoring and evaluation of 
programs--all identified by scholars as lacking in other interventions (Fassin and Pandolfi 
2010; Malkki 1995a; Terry 2002)--featured prominently in my conversations with 
humanitarian workers in Bertoua. Routinized refugee crises such as that in Cameroon 
provide a glimpse of how the refugee regime operates under “normal” circumstances, and 
how NGO policies and practices can contribute to a successful integration effort.
Inter-organizational collaboration
 With the institutionalization and professionalization of the refugee regime, a 
proliferation of organizations has become involved in refugee responses around the 
world. Cameroon is no exception: during my fieldwork, seven years after the initial 
influx of refugees, fourteen different major international organizations were working with 
refugees in the East. With this many organizations in place, one could imagine problems 
as organizations compete for the same work or the same funds; Terry notes that such 
competition has been the norm elsewhere, such as in Nicaragua and Cambodia (2002). 
There are, however, systems of collaboration and coordination in place in Cameroon to 
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mitigate the risks of duplication of efforts or competition between NGOs; these systems 
try to ensure the most efficient use of everyone’s time and resources. 
 Systems of coordination are not as elaborate in Cameroon as in other places. 
“Dans les pays où l’action humanitaire est très développé, il y a un organe des Nations 
Unies qui s’appelle OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] qui est 
chargé de coordonner les actions humanitaires. Mais ici OCHA n’est pas présent parce 
qu’il n’y a pas assez d’attrait humanitaire, on va dire”16 (Dominique, interview 4/23/12). 
In the absence of a separate coordinating organization, the UNHCR convenes meetings 
with the NGOs. “Quand c’est OCHA qui organise les réunions, c’est plus sur la stratégie, 
il y a plus de réflexion sur les besoins, les réponses, les échanges d’information entre les 
intervenants. Ici, ça prend souvent la forme de compte rendu d’activités avec le bailleur 
principal, qui est le HCR”17 (Dominique, interview 4/23/12). Although the coordination 
in Cameroon is more informal, it appears effective; the actors share information and build 
relationships, working in some senses as a team. “C’est une petite communauté, donc on 
se voit de temps en temps, on connaît les numéros de téléphone respectifs, et s’il y a une 
question ça ne pose pas de problème”18 (Dominique, interview 4/23/12). 
 One important element of this community among humanitarian organizations is 
the social aspect. Expatriates far from home often build community among themselves 
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16 “In countries where humanitarian action is very developed, there is an organ of the UN that is called 
OCHA [Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] that is charged with coordinating 
humanitarian activities. But here OCHA is not present because there is not enough humanitarian appeal, 
one could say.”
17 “When it’s OCHA that organizes the meetings, it’s more about strategy, there is more reflection on needs, 
responses, exchanges of information between the intervenors. Here, it often takes the form of a report of 
activities with the principal donor, which is the HCR.” 
18 “It’s a little community, so we see each other from time to time, we know each other’s phone numbers, 
and if there is a question it doesn’t pose any problems.” 
and spend their free time together (Cain, Postlewait, and Thomson 2004). There were 
several expatriates working in Bertoua, including my primary informants at PU-AMI, 
who did socialize together. However, the vast majority of NGO employees I encountered 
were Cameroonian. The influence this demographic makeup had on social relationships 
between humanitarian NGOs is important but beyond the scope of this study.
 Coordination is also facilitated by donor organizations, which institute conditions 
for how their funds can be used. Especially for donors, such as the UNHCR, that fund 
projects shared by several organizations in the same region, ensuring a uniform 
intervention and avoiding unnecessary duplication are priorities: 
 Donc, on va dire qu’il y a un problème de sécurité alimentaire dans l’Est de 
 Cameroun. Et puis Première Urgence, on va dire que, face à ce problème, on va 
 distribuer de la nourriture. Et puis, IRD [International Relief and Development] 
 va dire, nous, face à ce problème, on va distribuer des semences. Alors, le 
 bailleur, il va dire, bah non. Vous distribuez tous de semences et des outils, pour 
 pas qu’il y a un village avec IRD qui reçoit ça, un village qui reçoit autre chose.19 
 [Dominique, interview 4/23/12]
Conversely, donors may dictate that organizations work on different projects so that 
efforts are not duplicated. Domains of intervention are divided among the NGOs in the 
East. Emergency distribution of food and other supplies, for example, falls to the 
International Federation of the Red Cross, the Cameroonian Red Cross, and Plan 
Cameroon. These organizations also undertake education projects by building classrooms 
and providing teaching materials. A third category of intervention is that of health: 
building or rehabilitating health clinics. This is handled by the French Red Cross, Africa 
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19 “So, let’s say there’s a problem of food security in the East of Cameroon. And Première Urgence says, in 
response to this problem we will distribute food. And then IRD [International Relief and Development] 
says we, in response to this problem, will distribute seeds. The donor is going to say, no way! You will all 
distribute seeds and tools, so that there isn’t one village with IRD that receives one thing and another 
village that receives something else.”
Humanitarian Action, and International Medical Corps. Water and sanitation, which 
involves providing safe access to clean water, is worked on by another American 
organization, International Relief and Development (IRD), as well as PU-AMI. The 
Spanish Red Cross, as well as IRD and PU-AMI, provide resources to help refugee 
communities make the transition to an agricultural way of life. A final domain of 
intervention is community mobilization, which is the focus of the Swiss NGO Fairmed.
 Thus, through information-sharing meetings organized by the UNHCR and 
through strategic distribution of tasks by donor organizations, collaboration with other 
humanitarian organizations is a part of everyday operating for NGOs in the East. Though 
many autonomous organizations are involved in the refugee response in the region, 
working in collaboration was the accepted norm. This suggests the establishment of inter-
agency cooperation as a best practice among humanitarian agencies. 
Cultural sensitivity 
 Those working with refugees in the East are keenly aware of the dangers of 
ignoring cultural particularities when designing programs. One informant related a 
cautionary tale of something that happened to another, unnamed NGO:
 There was a situation in the north of Cameroon. An NGO constructed a water 
 point, and since they thought that it’s good to respect the traditional ruler of the 
 place, the water point was placed in front of the traditional ruler’s house. After 
 some time, they realized that women and children kept going back to those 
 unclean sources of water. So when they decided to find out what was actually 
 happening, women said that they would have preferred that the water point be 
 elsewhere, because in their culture a woman is supposed to be veiled, and a 
 woman is not supposed to go in the presence of men. And at the traditional 
 leader’s place, there were always men sitting there. [Edith, interview 4/13/12]
54
Had the NGO in this story understood the culture of the people in the area, the well might 
have been built where it was more useful to the community. Creating culturally sensitive 
programs was important to everyone I talked to, and everyone was adamant that they 
were doing their best to avoid the sorts of situations exemplified by the story above. 
 Efforts to incorporate cultural considerations were evident in NGOs’ program 
design and implementation. Even during the initial, emergency phase of an intervention, 
when basic needs such as food and shelter must be met as quickly as possible, NGOs 
strove to remain sensitive to cultural practices: 
 Quand on propose de faire des habitations d’urgence dans des pays où la culture 
 implique une séparation homme/femme, même si ce sont des tentes, même si ce 
 sont des choses très provisoires, on doit prendre en compte le fait qu’on travaille 
 avec une culture dans laquelle une femme ne peut pas se dévêtir, ou se dévoiler, 
 devant un homme. Pareil pour les toilettes.20 [Dominique, interview 4/25/12]
 
Such statements demonstrate recognition that without attendance to cultural norms, 
programs may create new problems rather than solving old ones. 
 This is not to say that NGOs prioritize cultural preferences over all other 
considerations. The question of women’s role in a family and household, for example, is 
important in Central African refugee communities. “Chez les Mbororo, la femme n’a pas 
accès à l’argent, ou à l'économie de ménage. Et donc, pour que ces communautés 
puissent continuer à vivre de façon autonome, il a fallu que les femmes arrivent à gagner 
de l’argent et à travailler”21 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). My informant admitted that 
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20 “When we propose to built emergency shelters in a country where the culture implies a separation of men 
and women, even if they’re tents, even if they’re very temporary things, we have to consider the fact that 
we are working with a culture in which a woman cannot undress, or unveil, in front of a man. It’s the same 
for the toilets.” 
21 “Among the Mbororo, the wife doesn’t have access to money, or to the household budget. And so, for 
these communities to continue living autonomously, it was necessary that the women begin earning money 
and working.”
by encouraging women to work and manage money, her organization had asked 
communities to “reviser tout leur code culturel”22 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). At the 
same time, PU-AMI tries to respect the most important elements of existing cultural 
norms. “On a fait aussi attention à ce que l'équilibre culturel, l’homme dominant, qui 
garde sa fierté et qui aussi apporte à manger à la famille, reste stable”23 (Dominique, 
interview 4/6/12). Sensitivity to cultural practices, like collaboration, has become part of 
routine practice for responding to refugee emergencies. 
Community participation
 NGOs in the East are also dedicated to including beneficiaries in program 
planning. Excludes local people invites cultural misunderstandings and lower participant 
investment in the long term. NGOs in Bertoua have experienced this problem:
 Il y aura des gens qui ont construit [les latrines] pour faire plaisir à l’ONG, en se 
 disant, bon, il nous demande de faire ça, ç'a l’air d’être important pour eux, donc, 
 on va le faire. Peut-être que si on leur fait plaisir, ils nous donneront peut-être un 
 forage ou des bassines. Donc, il faut revenir un certain temps pour vérifier que le 
 message a été vraiment absorbé par la plupart de personnes. Et souvent, en 
 premier étape on a 70 pour-cent des villageois qui ont construit des latrines, et 
 puis, deuxième étape il y a 50 pour-cent des villageois qui utilisent les latrines. Il 
 y a une perte entre les deux.24  [Dominique, interview 4/23/12]
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22 “revise their entire cultural code”
23 “We also paid attention that the cultural balance, with the dominant man who keeps his pride and who 
also brings food to the family, remained stable.”
24 “There will be people who build [the latrines] to please the NGO, saying to themselves, ok, they’re 
asking us to do this, it seems important to them, so we’ll do it. Maybe if we please them they’ll give us a 
well or some bowls. So, we have to come back after a while to make sure the message has really been 
absorbed by most people. And often, at the first stage we have 70 percent of villagers who have built 
latrines, and then at the second stage there are 50 percent who are using them. There is a loss between the 
two.” 
Messages from outsiders, even if initially well-received, do not have the staying power of 
ideas that can be reinforced by the community. For projects to be truly useful to 
communities, support for them must come from within the community itself.
 To avoid situations such as that described above, NGOs include communities in 
the planning, implementation, and evaluation of projects. Community participation is 
identified by Plan Cameroon as the central aspect of its identity as an organization. 
 Plan brings its  contribution, but the beneficiaries also contribute for their projects. 
 These groups are responsible for the development of the community. Plan is 
 coming to support the groups in order to achieve their objectives. Plan will not be 
 forever in those communities. Development, for it to be sustainable, you need to 
 be able to empower the beneficiaries to be able to take over when the organization 
 leaves. [Edith, interview 4/13/12]
Plan works with local authorities such as local councils, women’s groups, parent-teacher 
associations, community development organizations, and water management committees 
as well as chiefs and local government officials to ensure that their projects fit 
community needs and expectations and to ensure that communities gain autonomy in 
managing the projects. By positioning itself in support of community-driven initiatives, 
Plan ensures that community participation is at the center of its activities. 
 PU-AMI seeks to make community involvement central to its project 
implementation as well. This emphasis on community involvement is based on a desire to 
avoid creating a dependency on aid in the community: 
La spécificité, la priorité pour notre ONG, c’est de réagir très vite sur les 
 situations, mais avoir, dès le départ, une intervention qui prend en compte 
 l’autonomie des personnes. C’est-à-dire qu’il faut distribuer de la nourriture, des 
 vêtements, des médicaments, mais on raccourcit au maximum le temps de 
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 distributions d’urgences pour très vite donner une appropriation et une autonomie 
 aux bénéficiaires.25 [Dominique, interview 4/6/12]
PU-AMI, like Plan, consults with community leaders such as traditional chiefs before 
beginning projects, and holds community meetings to gain input from a wide range of 
people. One field coordinator at the organization described the FAST method, used by 
PU-AMI to involve community members in formulating solutions to community needs:
 La méthode FAST ne consiste pas à enseigner. On ne dit pas faites ceci, faites 
 cela. Mais on essaie juste à travers des images, on illustre les problèmes qu’il y a 
 au sein de la communauté, la communauté elle-même se reconnaît là, et puis 
 ensemble la communauté propose des solutions pour résoudre ces problèmes. 
 Donc c’est une méthode participative. Parce que si la communauté elle-même 
 participe à la formulation des recommandations, ou bien des solutions des 
 problèmes qui la concerne directement, facilement elle pourra bien appliquer tous 
 les consignes.26 [Pierre, interview 4/23/12] 
Though it does not guarantee the success of a program, community participation helps 
ensure its relevance to the community in question. Programs based on community 
involvement are clearly the norm for refugee-relief organizations working in Cameroon. 
These organizations do not import pre-formulated plans for projects; they actively consult 
with the communities concerned to support them in efforts to address community needs. 
This speaks to the nature of the “routinized” refugee crisis: the routine does not lie in the 
format of the programs themselves but in the approach to consulting with local 
communities to develop solutions.
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25 “The specificity, the priority for our NGO is to react very quickly to situations, but to have, from the 
beginning, an intervention that accounts for people’s autonomy. That is to say that it is necessary to 
distribute food, clothing, medicines, but we shorten the period of emergency distribution as much as 
possible to very quickly give an appropriation and an autonomy to the beneficiaries.” 
26 “The FAST method doesn’t consist of teaching. We don’t say, do this, do that. But we just try through 
images, we illustrate the problems within the community, the community recognizes itself there, and then 
together the community proposes solutions to resolve these problems. So it’s a participatory method. 
Because if the community itself participates in the formulation of recommendations, or of solutions to the 
problems that concern it directly, it will easily be able to apply all of the requirements.”
Financial monitoring and accountability
 An international refugee relief effort involves large sums of money, and questions 
may arise about where the funds are going, how they are being managed and whether 
they might slip into unintended hands. In Cameroon, concerns about corruption are 
certainly relevant; I will address Cameroon’s history with corruption in more detail in 
Chapter Four. Serious focus on systems of financial accountability, however, may seem 
secondary in the face of the urgency and assumed altruistic nature of humanitarian 
interventions. Putting financial accountability second has caused problems in past 
interventions, and my research clearly illustrates that systems of financial monitoring are 
firmly established in the NGOs working with refugees in the East.
 The director of PU-AMI expressed to me how crucial the procedures around 
financial accountability are to the day-to-day operations of the organization:
 Tous nos actions doivent être justifiées et motivées. On ne peut pas acheter un 
 produit comme ça en allant au magasin. On doit définir quel produit on doit 
 acheter, et choisir à plusieurs quel fournisseur on va sélectionner. On essaie de 
 garantir au maximum que l’achat ne se fait pas avec la famille, ou avec un peu 
 d’argent qui s'arrête dans la poche. Au niveau administratif, tous les financements 
 sont justifies. Chaque centime.27 [Dominique, interview 4/23/12]
In fact, she said, tracking expenditures and ensuring that all accounts are in order makes 
up the bulk of the administrative work for office-based employees. Accountability is not 
expected only of the administration, however; those based in the field also keep close 
track of all finances. “Les gens qui travaillent sur le terrain font des rapports tous les 
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27 “All our activities must be justified. You can’t just go into a store and buy a product. You have to define 
which product you need to buy, and select between several suppliers. We try to maximally guarantee that 
purchases aren’t made with the family, or with a little bit of money ending up in someone’s pocket. At the 
administrative level, all our finances are justified. Every cent.” 
jours, on sait où ils sont, ce qu’ils font, pourquoi ils le font, quel résultat ils ont obtenu”28 
(Dominique, interview 4/23/12).  
 The account assistant at Plan described with pride the importance of her role in 
the organization and the necessity of keeping track of expenses and monitoring finances: 
 On pense qu’on peut créer des activités et les faire parce qu’il y a l’argent dans tel 
 ou tel ligne. Mais il faut toujours leur dire, mais voilà ce que nos plannings 
 d'activités disent, il faut respecter ça. Et ça-là va du paire avec l’argent que je suis 
 appelée à surveiller. Sinon, on aura des problèmes en fin d'année quand le dicte va 
 passer. Donc, c’est une grosse responsabilité.29 [Geneviève, interview 4/13/12]
Her sense of responsibility within the organization highlights the importance of such 
account-keeping activities to the organizational identity at Plan. 
 Both of these organizations also emphasized the central role of donor 
organizations in enforcing policies about transparency and financial accountability. At 
Plan, “on doit [tout] présenter aux bailleurs. Il faut vraiment que le suivi soit bien fait 
pour que les rapports aussi soient exactes avant de les transmettre à la hiérarchie, pour 
qu’on ne donne pas les mauvais rapports”30 (Geneviève, interview 4/13/12). Supervision 
by donors is an equally important reality at PU-AMI: “Les bailleurs font beaucoup 
d’audits. Ils regardent tous les dossiers, comment on a acheté ça, etc. Et ils vont sur le 
terrain pour voir s’il y a vraiment un pompe, s’il y a vraiment un point d’eau, et parler 
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28 “The people who work in the field make reports every day, we know where they are, what they’re doing, 
why they’re doing it, what result they have obtained.”
29 “People think they can create activities and do them because there’s money in this or this line [of the 
budget]. But I have to tell them, look what our plans of activities say, we have to respect that. And that goes 
hand in hand with the money I’m called on to supervise. If not, we’ll have problems at the end of the year 
with our reports. So, it’s a big responsibility.”
30 “we have to present everything to the donors. It’s absolutely essential that the supervision is well done so 
that the reports are exact before we sent them to the hierarchy, so that we don’t give bad reports.” 
avec les gens pour savoir s’ils sont contents, s’ils ne sont pas malades”31 (Dominique, 
interview 4/23/12). Donors’ monitoring of funds illustrates the firm establishment of 
policies of financial accountability within the refugee regime; NGOs, and the larger 
regime structure, understand these policies as crucial to the success of the intervention.
Flexibility, evaluation, and learning from mistakes
 Evaluations of past humanitarian interventions have suggested that because of 
their hierarchical structures and need to maintain their reputations, humanitarian NGOs 
are resistant to change. The culture among humanitarian workers does not encourage 
admitting to being wrong, so they continue to make the same mistakes (Terry 2002). This 
idea of a culture of silence seems incongruent with the reality, or at least the ideal reality, 
of NGOs in eastern Cameroon. Built into the structures of these NGOs are processes for 
evaluating their programs and adjusting if needed. Such processes appear to promote a 
culture of openness to honest discussion about the best ways for NGOs to do their work. 
 The approaches of Plan and PU-AMI to revising their programs and learning from 
mistakes are similar. Both organizations investigate community needs before creating a 
program and monitor programs throughout their implementation. They evaluate programs 
at their conclusion as well, to assess their impacts. The director of Plan expressed the 
importance of adjusting the approach to a project if it is running into difficulties: 
 Monitoring has to do with verification of our strategy, are we moving towards our 
 objective? If we are not, what is the barrier or what is the blockage? And how can 
 we change to do better? So in that case, you may decide to modify your strategy, 
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31 “The donors do a lot of audits. They look at all the dossiers, how we bought this or that, etc. And the go 
into the field to see that there really is a pump, there really is a well, and to talk with the people to see if 
they are happy, if they’re not sick.”
 to add some activities or do things differently or improve on the resources based 
 on your evaluation. [Edith, interview 4/13/12]
At PU-AMI, the administrator in charge of field-based employees meets with them 
regularly to evaluate their work:
 Il faut les écouter pour entendre leurs problèmes, et leur dire, bon, alors, vous 
 avez fait ça, est-ce que vous avez pensé que c’était bien ?  Est-ce que vous pensez 
 qu’on aurait pu l'améliorer, le faire mieux ? Est-ce que vous avez eu des 
 problèmes logistique, ou de présentation du projet aux bénéficiaires?32 
 [Dominique, interview 4/23/12]
In practice, these processes of evaluation and change are undoubtedly messier than these 
descriptions suggest; human action is imperfect and efforts to transform it seldom work 
without glitches. The ideal expressed in the above quotes, though, is that these 
imperfections will be admitted and addressed. This ideal, though it may not work 
perfectly in practice, is a guiding foundational principle for these organizations.
 The difference between the evaluation processes of the two organizations lies in 
their senses of temporality. Plan, though it hopes that communities and the government 
will take over its functions eventually, understands its community development work in a 
longer-term way as compared to strictly humanitarian NGOs. Because they will be 
present for the foreseeable future, those at Plan can design programs with a longer time 
frame in mind. Plan’s activities are organized in a five-year strategic plan, with 
monitoring and evaluation activities calibrated accordingly. Plan has well-established 
organizational procedures for conducting evaluation activities, involving monthly 
planning meetings for all staff members. 
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32 “You have to listen to them to understand their problems, and say to them, ok, you did this, do you think 
that was good? Do you think we could have improved on it, done it better? Did you have any problems 
with logistics, or with presenting the project to beneficiaries?”
 PU-AMI, on the other hand, sees its presence in Cameroon as directly related to 
the influx of refugees and will leave when the “crisis” ends. PU-AMI works on one- to 
two-year contracts with donor organizations, and there is a great deal more uncertainty 
about which programs will be happening, and who will be involved, at any given time. 
When a project is renewed, the entire staff of the project must be re-hired. The 
administration of the organization is made up of expatriates who typically stay for two 
years at the most, making for frequent transitions in leadership. All of these factors make 
continuity and consistency of evaluative approaches more challenging at PU-AMI.  
Though coordination meetings for the administrative staff happened “ideally” once a 
month, and the organization was in the midst of instituting coordination meetings for 
field staff, evaluative processes were less institutionalized at PU-AMI than at Plan. At 
both organizations, however, informants recognized the need to provide objective 
measures of success, and the “buzzword” status of the phrase “monitoring and 
evaluation” suggests that this is a current and salient issue in the humanitarian world. 
Professionalization and the role of academia
 Admittedly, I entered the field with previous notions about humanitarianism. 
Having read critical scholars such as Fassin (2011) and Terry (2002), I was primed to see 
the flaws in the delivery of refugee assistance. I expected that humanitarian principles 
might be compromised in contexts of exceptionality. On the contrary, adherence to 
proven yet flexible strategies was the expected mode of operating everywhere I visited. 
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 This is not to say that my informants were unaware of the possibility of 
complications arising with these principles. One PU-AMI employee described what she 
considered “la question traditionnelle des humanitaires”33 - when does it become 
unacceptable to remain silent in the face of human rights violations in the host country, 
even if that silence can guarantee the ongoing presence of the NGO and continued 
assistance of people in need (Dominique, interview 4/23/12)? Different NGOs, she 
admitted, answered this question differently. So far, however, she had not encountered 
such a situation in Cameroon. Others, particularly younger professionals who had 
completed academic training in humanitarianism, seemed to echo precisely the scholarly 
critiques I had read: “Il y a des réussites, il y a des impacts positifs. Mais aussi des 
impacts négatifs, hein ? Ça arrive”34 (Monique, interview 4/18/12). 
 One explanation for the widespread acceptance of these core values and 
awareness of the potential hazards of humanitarian work is the very existence of degrees 
and specialized training specific to this field: “L’humanitaire a évolué. Le métier s’est 
fortifie. Puisque, quand j’ai commencé on était volontaires, il y avait un certain 
amateurisme, en fait. On peut le dire. Et maintenant, mes jeunes collègues, qui sont avec 
moi, ont quasiment tous fait des études spécifiques humanitaires”35 (Dominique, 
interview 4/25/12). Over time, the refugee regime has professionalized and certain 
methods have become standard. The humanitarian profession is intertwined with 
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33 “The traditional question of humanitarians”
34 “There are successes, there are positive impacts. But also negative impacts, you know? That happens.”
35 “Humanitarianism has evolved. The profession has gotten stronger. Because, when I began we were 
volunteers, there was a certain amateurism, in fact. One could say. And now, my young colleagues who are 
with me, have practically all done studies specific to humanitarianism.” 
humanitarian fields of study: the language used and ideas expressed by my informants 
illustrated the influence of scholars who have critiqued other refugee responses. This 
affirms the importance of academic study of humanitarian work, as well as the impacts 
such study has on policy-making. Academic discourses have real effects on the ground, 
whether or not that is their intent; I return to this discussion in Chapter Five.
Conclusion
 This chapter has drawn on my interviews with employees of NGOs in Bertoua to 
examine what they understand to be working well in the refugee response in eastern 
Cameroon. Although no such long-term international undertaking can ever proceed 
completely smoothly, at least from my informants’ perspective the integration of refugees 
into Cameroonian communities is fairly successful. This situation provides an important 
case study of integration as a viable alternative to refugee camps, and a glimpse of how 
NGOs can draw on best practices to facilitate that integration. In this case, practitioners 
observe that their actions in the context of local integration have had positive outcomes 
for Central Africans seeking refuge in eastern Cameroonian communities.
 Obviously, things in Cameroon could always be better; otherwise, the NGOs 
would not still be present. As they continue to help build stronger and more autonomous 
communities, however, my informants recognize that Cameroon is something of a 
uniquely good place to be a humanitarian worker:    
 Globalement je dirais que travailler au Cameroun, c’est relativement facile. 
 Puisque, déjà c’est un des rares pays d’intervenance humanitaire où il n’y a pas de 
 problèmes de sécurité. Le niveau de l'éducation au Cameroun est très bon, donc 
 on a des collègues qui sont bien formés. Le climat est bon, la nourriture est bonne. 
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 C’est vraiment un pays qui est plutôt accueillant. Et, bon, sur la mission au 
 Cameroun, proprement dite on est plutôt content de notre sort.36 [Dominique, 
 interview 4/25/12] 
It is this relatively secure and conducive environment that allows the refugee regime to 
work according to standard procedures in this routinized emergency. Cameroon thus 
provides insight into the ideals currently guiding the work of the refugee regime as well 
as approaches the regime can take to creating more innovative and effective solutions in 
other contexts.
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36 “Overall I would say that working in Cameroon is relatively easy. Because, already it’s one of the rare 
countries of humanitarian intervention where there aren’t security problems. The level of education in 
Cameroon is very good, so we have colleagues who are well trained. The climate is good, the food is good. 
It’s really a country that is rather welcoming. So on the mission in Cameroon, to tell the truth, we’re pretty 
content with our lot.” 
Chapter Four
Humanitarianism, Development, and Cameroonian State-Building
 The UNHCR and its network of international partner NGOs in eastern Cameroon 
bring with them an array of resources. These resources are financial and material, in the 
form of distribution of goods or creation of new infrastructure. But they are also less 
tangible - career development for employees of the NGOs, capacity-building for local 
agencies, increased prestige or legitimacy in the eyes of the international community for 
the host country. These less-tangible outcomes of a refugee response are often not 
explicitly included in the goals of an intervention. However, these “unintended 
consequences” or “side effects” of humanitarian action may be some of the most 
significant outcomes of a refugee response and thus should not be overlooked in analysis 
of the situation. The benefits of the international humanitarian presence, through the 
medium of a successfully handled integration effort, extend beyond the humanitarian 
space into Cameroon’s processes of development and nation-building; these development 
benefits in turn bolster Cameroon’s position within the national order of things. 
Theoretical Understandings of Effects of International Aid
Fiona Terry, in Condemned to Repeat, presents several cases of militarization of 
refugee camps as illustrative of the inherent paradox of humanitarian action: “it can 
contradict its fundamental purpose by prolonging the suffering it intends to 
alleviate” (Terry 2002:2). When this occurs, humanitarian action fails in its stated goal of 
protecting the vulnerable and alleviating suffering. It does, however, have other impacts: 
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it contributes to war economies and provides a humanitarian sanctuary from which 
guerrilla groups can stage their subversive activities. Terry’s work highlights the capacity 
of humanitarianism to unintentionally affect the societies in which it is carried out.
James Ferguson (1990) has also examined the unintended “side effects” of aid, 
in the context of rural development projects in Lesotho. He concludes that “failed” 
development projects often reinforce state power by increasing governmental presence in 
and access to the rural regions where the projects take place. The stated goals and 
explicitly “apolitical” nature of the projects obscure these “collateral” outcomes, which 
are in fact extremely political in nature. As a result, the development industry becomes an 
“anti-politics machine,” employing apolitical messages to disconnect the industry’s 
actions from their political effects. 
The conclusions of both scholars are relevant for examining the “side effects” 
of aid in eastern Cameroon. It is especially significant that, because of integration, the 
international resources brought into Cameroon go directly into Cameroonian host 
communities. Though the stated goals of the refugee regime may be humanitarian in 
nature, the political ramifications of bringing these resources into the picture should not 
be ignored. Putting Ferguson in conversation with Terry suggests that the unintended 
political consequences of humanitarian interventions can be as significant as the political 
consequences of a rural development project. Resources flow to local communities in 
ways that are both explicit and obscured, and influxes of financial resources inevitably 
have political consequences. Furthermore, focusing international attention and resources 
on a marginal border region presents an opportunity for the state to strengthen its 
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presence at the periphery of its territory. The discourse of neutrality surrounding refugee 
responses often means that these political consequences go unexamined. 
However, a recent study of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya does assess the 
impacts of the camp on the host community (Government of Denmark et al. 2010). The 
study concludes that the response to the large-scale influx of refugees from Somalia holds 
significant social and economic opportunities for surrounding communities, and that local 
Kenyans have been capitalizing on and benefitting from these opportunities (Government 
of Denmark et al. 2010). However, the study also concludes that “there is a need to 
further integrate the support provided to refugees with that provided to host communities. 
A short-term humanitarian approach to support is not conducive to meaningful 
development of the host area” (Government of Denmark et al. 2010:79). 
The refugee influx and humanitarian response in eastern Cameroon holds 
similar opportunities for host communities as the Dadaab camp in Kenya. However, 
integration of refugees in Cameroon addresses the problems identified by the Dadaab 
study. This aspect of the situation in Cameroon creates an opportunity for the resources 
accompanying the refugee response to benefit Cameroon. Those benefits, though perhaps 
understood by NGOs as tangential byproducts of their true humanitarian purpose, are 
some of the most salient impacts of the refugee regime’s presence in Cameroon. 
International Aid and Resource Flows
 What kinds of resources are flowing into Cameroon through the international 
community’s presence, and where do these resources come from? Once they arrive in 
69
Cameroon, where do they go; do some groups benefit more than others? Understanding 
the resource flows involved is crucial to exploring the secondary effects of such a sudden 
influx of aid. This section presents a rather cursory overview of the flows of financial 
resources entering Cameroon in response to the presence of refugees; more detailed 
examinations of state-level and local economic implications of the refugee response is 
beyond the scope of my research, but would be a fruitful area for further investigation.
 The UNHCR, as the most visible international refugee-assistance agency, serves 
as the main conduit for refugee aid funds flowing into Cameroon. The UNHCR receives 
most of its donations from UN member states. In 2011, the most recent year for which 
confirmed data on the UNHCR’s work in Cameroon is available, the UNHCR received 
US$ 63,000 in contributions earmarked specifically for Cameroon (UNHCR 2011b:17). 
It supplemented these contributions with additional funds from unearmarked donations, 
for a total budget of US$ 23,947,527 (UNHCR 2011b:17; UNHCR 2012a:15). 
 Though this may seem a sizable sum, the UNHCR budget for Cameroon cannot 
equal that of high-profile situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which had a 
2011 UNHCR budget of US$ 150,921,401, or the Sudans, with a 2011 total of US$ 
232,472,193 (UNHCR 2012a:75). Indeed, 2011 expenditures in Cameroon represented 
less than six percent of the UNHCR’s budget for Central Africa and the Great Lakes, and 
about one percent of the UNHCR’s total budget for Africa (UNHCR 2012a:75). The 
benefit of a large and well-known organization such as UNHCR is that it can distribute 
funds according to need, ensuring that situations such as that in Cameroon are not 
completely overlooked when donors are more interested in higher-profile situations. 
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 The UNHCR’s budget in Cameroon finances its own activities, such as provision 
of identification documents; supports its in-country offices and staff; helps finance the 
creation of a national framework for determination of refugee status; and funds the 
projects of implementing partner organizations, the largest portion of the budget 
(UNHCR 2011b:17). The UNHCR is an important donor for these partner organizations, 
but most have other funding sources as well. Some organizations have “fonds propres” - 
donations they receive independently. Plan, for example, maintains a child-sponsorship 
program to receive donations from individuals in wealthier countries. Other 
organizations, such as PU-AMI, rely mainly on donor organization grants. In addition to 
the UNHCR, PU-AMI receives funding from Europaide, the European Union, ECHO 
(the European Community Humanitarian Office), UNICEF, the World Health 
Organization, the embassies of France, the US, and Sweden, and various foundations and 
corporations. Understanding where the funds for a humanitarian intervention come from 
is important because of the strings that usually come attached to aid; conditions on how 
funds can be used will be different for money coming from a government versus a 
foundation versus individual donors. The funding conditions they must work with affect 
how independent humanitarian organizations can be in practice.  
 Once these funds reach the NGOs, they are mainly used for two things: 
maintaining the organization and implementing its programs. The first of these activities 
includes costs for administrative supplies (paper, pens, printer ink, etc), purchasing and 
maintaining vehicles, and paying staff salaries. All of this has implications for local 
economies, through buying supplies or hiring local internet and air conditioning 
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technicians, for example. Perhaps most significantly, these organizations create 
employment opportunities, building human capital and incorporating more people into a 
wage-labor system reported to have a 30 percent unemployment rate37 (Central 
Intelligence Agency, n.d.). Salaries paid to the staff of these organizations also make their 
way into local economies as these people purchase goods and services. 
 The second component of NGOs’ budgets, that of implementing projects in the 
field, is what comes to mind most readily when we imagine where international aid goes. 
In Bertoua and in rural villages throughout the East, financial resources are transformed 
into infrastructure such as wells, latrines, classrooms, and health clinics; into emergency 
relief such as food aid, seeds to plant gardens, or hygiene kits; and into human capital 
through trainings and education. While the obvious targets of this aid are refugees, 
Cameroon’s refugee integration model means that aid benefits Cameroonian communities 
as well. This means that the effects of the international presence in the East go much 
deeper than what is immediately visible: this presence has important implications for 
processes of national development. Investments that the refugee regime makes in 
Cameroonian villages38 lessen the government’s need to make those same investments. 
Those investments happen at a number of levels, from direct assistance to human capital 
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37 This is not to say that 30 percent of Cameroonians have no way to make a living. As is true in many 
African contexts, the informal sector plays a significant role in local economies. By creating jobs in the 
formal section, however, the refugee regime links Cameroon more firmly to the normativity of the formal 
wage-labor system.
38 I recognize that the refugee regime is likely not the only international actor making such contributions in 
Cameroon. There are, for example, international development agencies also present in the East. There may 
be other contributions from the international community as well; for example, China has made direct 
contributions to industry and business in many African countries. I restrict my analysis in this thesis, 
however, to the contributions made by organizations whose work relates to the refugee response.
building to governmental consulting, all supported by the international resources attracted 
to Cameroon by the presence of refugees.
Impacts of the Refugee Regime beyond the Humanitarian Space
Direct assistance and creation of infrastructure
 As resources enter Cameroon through the processes described above, they have a 
variety of effects. The most obvious, because it is the most explicit goal, is providing 
direct aid to refugees, who often require initial assistance to feed and house themselves. 
Distributions of food or seeds or hygiene kits, though once consumed they are gone, help 
communities avoid large-scale malnutrition and disease, which would put strain on social 
support systems. NGOs also create more lasting structures, including wells, latrines, 
health clinics, and school buildings or classrooms. This new infrastructure benefits both 
refugees and Cameroonians, improving the quality of life in communities that lacked 
such amenities before the arrival of the refugees. “Quand les réfugiés partiront, ils ne 
vont pas amener les centres de santé chez eux. Ils vont les laisser ici. Ça fait un 
développement significatif du pays”39 (Charles, interview 4/2/12). Charles, as a 
government representative, demonstrates a recognition at the level of the government of 
the significance of the this direct assistance to the development of Cameroon.
 The fact that amenities created by international NGOs are available to both 
refugees and host communities is important. The refugee-integration model detailed in 
Chapter Three is a significant factor influencing how outside resources impact 
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39 “When the refugees leave, they won’t take the health centers with them. They will leave them here. That 
represents a significant development of the country.”
Cameroon’s development. If camps existed, infrastructure built for refugees would do 
less to benefit Cameroonian communities. Because refugees live within those 
communities, however, resources are shared: 
 Vous voyez d’abord la population camerounaise qui a juste accès à un seul point 
 d’eau. Les ressources ne suffisaient même pas pour les camerounais, avec les 
 réfugiés ça va créer des problèmes. C’est pour cela que presque tous les projets 
 maintenant sont vraiment pour bénéficier les deux communautés. Un centre de 
 santé, on ne va jamais dire que ça c’est le centre de santé des réfugiés, ça c’est le 
 centre de santé des camerounais. Toute la communauté à accès à ce centre de 
 santé.40 [Pierre, interview 4/23/12]
Including Cameroonians in NGOs’ programs is seen as a way to better serve refugees and 
facilitate their integration. This interpretation, however, does little to acknowledge the 
effects of international actors and resources on the development of Cameroon. 
 The contributions of the international community to Cameroon’s development are 
tied to the idea of burden-sharing. This concept, that the international community has a 
duty to assist countries hosting a large number of refugees, is well-established in the 
African context through such documents as the 1969 OAU Convention. Burden-sharing 
is on the minds of the Cameroonian administration: “Il y a la partage de la charge. 
‘Burden-sharing.’ C’est-a-dire qu’on accueille 104,000 réfugiés aujourd’hui, avec très 
peu de moyens. Alors, on aimerait que les pays occidentaux nous viennent en aide pour 
pouvoir régler ce problème”41 (Charles, interview 4/2/12).  
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40 “You see first of all the Cameroonian population that only has access to one well. The resources aren’t 
sufficient even for the Cameroonians, with the refugees that’s going to create problems. That’s why almost 
all the projects now are really to benefit the two communities. A health center, we’re never going to say that 
this is the refugees’ health center, this is the health center for the Cameroonians. The whole community has 
access to the health center.”
41 “There is the partage de la charge. Burden-sharing. That means that we welcome 104,000 refugees 
today, with very few means. So, we would like the Western countries to come to our aid in order to regulate 
this problem.”
 Interestingly, as the term “burden-sharing” has come into popular usage, its focus 
has shifted from African countries sharing the burden of their neighbors, as the OAU 
Convention suggests, to target the “pays occidentaux.”42 As a way for Western countries 
to help with problems in the developing world without having to physically take action, 
burden-sharing is an expression of the ties between humanitarianism and international 
struggles for power and influence (Zolberg et al. 1989). As the contributions of Western 
countries mediate the added burden of hosting refugees, they also aid the Cameroonian 
government in achieving its development goals. “Maintenant que le HCR a investi à la 
place du gouvernement camerounais, l’argent qui pouvait servir à la construction de ce 
centre de santé, de ces écoles, on peut le mettre ailleurs”43 (Charles, interview 4/2/12). 
The international presence responding to the refugee influx opens opportunities for 
development that would otherwise not be available to the Cameroonian government.
Concerns about corruption
 Although aid is ostensibly brought into Cameroonian communities to meet the 
needs of refugees, extending that aid to also benefit host communities is an intentional 
action. In this sense these development impacts are not truly unintended side effects; they  
are tacit outcomes of the intervention but not subversive ones. NGOs are, however, 
concerned that their resources could be put to illicit uses without their knowledge. One 
PU-AMI employee put it bluntly: “On sait bien qu’au Cameroun il y a beaucoup de 
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42 “Western countries”
43 “Now that the HCR has invested in the place of the Cameroonian government, the money that could have 
served to construct this health center, these schools, we can put it elsewhere.” 
corruption”44 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). In 1998, Transparency International named 
Cameroon the most corrupt country in the world in its annual Corruption Perceptions 
Index; in 2011 Cameroon still ranked 134th out of 182 countries in terms of transparency. 
NGOs must consider this reputation in planning and implementing their programs: how 
can they ensure that their resources can make the most positive impact while avoiding 
contributing to corruption? If organizations are not careful, it might happen that “on se 
vante de faire une aide directe aux populations, et du coup, on fait une aide aux gens de 
l’état qui ne sont pas forcément en aide”45 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). 
 These concerns are most notable in NGOs’ interactions with government 
administrations. NGOs have differing perceptions of appropriate ways to relate to the 
government. For example, Plan’s work is based on very close interactions with the 
government: “Plan came to Cameroon to support the government initiative; that’s why 
the protocol agreement was signed with the government. We are bound to collaborate 
with those government structures” (Edith, interview 4/10/12). Plan sees the government 
as holding ultimate responsibility for the work Plan does, so the two must work in close 
collaboration until the government is able to take over. PU-AMI, while also believing that 
its work in Cameroon is temporary and must eventually be taken over by local actors, is 
more hesitant about close collaboration with the government. “Soutenir les interventions 
de l’état, comment peut-on le faire sans mettre le doigt dans un encoignure de 
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44 “Everyone knows that there is a lot of corruption in Cameroon.”
45 “We boast of giving direct aid to the populations, and suddenly we’re aiding representatives of the state 
who aren’t necessarily in need.”
corruption?”46 (Dominique, interview 4/6/12). PU-AMI must consider this question 
carefully before engaging too closely in government partnerships.
 The director of PU-AMI identified a scenario that is common when working with 
government employees in Cameroon: 
 Il y a une demande quasi-systématique des fonctionnaires de l’état, quand on leur 
 demande de s’appliquer sur certains problèmes, ils ne le font qu’en moyen en 
 finance. Or, c’est leur travail, ils sont payés pour ça. Donc, on trouve que c’est un 
 peu curieux d’être obligé de les repayer pour qu’ils fassent juste leur travail. Et 
 d’évidence, on évalue que le fait de leur repayer crée des dysfonctionnements et 
 ça nourri quelque chose de malsain dans le pays.47 [Dominique, interview 
 4/25/12]
The fact that government employees expect NGOs to pay them a per diem, and that the 
NGOs need their cooperation to carry out their work in compliance with Cameroonian 
law, puts the NGOs in a tricky situation. Effective work requires governmental 
cooperation; at the same time, the resources NGOs invest in Cameroon are intended to 
directly benefit refugees, not government employees who already receive a salary. 
 Concerns about corruption are present not only in NGO-government interactions, 
however. Daniel Jordan Smith’s observations on corruption in Nigeria help illustrate 
other contexts where corruption comes into play. Smith argues that much of what we 
view as “corruption” is simply the expression of a different relational system that is at 
odds with the bureaucratic, hierarchical structures of Western-style democracies (Smith 
2008). Systems of patron-clientism, in which status or wealth is achieved based on who 
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46 “Supporting the interventions of the state, how can we do that without stepping into a trap of 
corruption?”
47 “There’s a practically systematic demand from functionaries of the state, when we ask them to help with 
certain problems, they won’t do it unless we pay them. But, this is their job, they’re paid for this. So, we 
find it a bit curious to be obliged to repay them to get them to do their jobs. And clearly, we observe that the 
fact of repaying them creates dysfunction and that feeds into something unhealthy in the country.”
you know, are cast as corruption within bureaucratic systems where achievements are 
supposedly based on what you can do (Smith 2008). The title of Smith’s 2008 book, A 
Culture of Corruption, refers to the idea that these relational systems are built into the 
cultural assumptions of society, making them difficult to combat (Smith 2008). 
Expatriates working in Cameroon note a similar phenomenon in their interactions with 
Cameroonians who have a different understanding of appropriate behavior in an 
organizational bureaucracy. National employees of international NGOs are trained into 
organizational systems of transparency and finance management to ensure that money is 
used in fair and ethical ways (as defined by organizational policy).  
 Although none of my informants even hinted that humanitarian aid itself might be 
fueling corruption in Cameroon (examples they gave were of corruption in other 
contexts, or of how they were avoiding pitfalls of corruption), clearly concerns about this 
possibility exist. Problems of corruption with humanitarian aid have been documented in 
other refugee crises (Andreas 2008), which may contribute to caution around the issue in 
Cameroon. While a detailed tracing of the use of resources for refugee aid in Cameroon is 
beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that diversion of resources by 
corruption is sometimes an unintended side effect of humanitarian interventions and that 
concerns about corruption are prevalent in the Cameroonian context. 
Capacity-building
 Not all benefits brought to Cameroon by the refugee regime are as tangible as 
financial resources or new infrastructure. Another important and lasting contribution of 
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international organizations is investment in human capital. The refugee regime, and the 
UNHCR in particular, constructs itself as a repository of expertise on the subject of 
refugees and humanitarian responses, and endeavors to share that expertise with local 
actors (Loescher 2001). This is in large part an attempt to ensure some sustainability of 
efforts after the eventual departure of the international NGOs. Capacity-building happens 
on a number of levels, from the community to the governmental, but the main 
beneficiaries in all cases are Cameroonians. Some capacity-building is part of the goals of 
these organizations, but other forms are less overt. This is not to say that the capacity-
building work of NGOs is somehow secretive or negative, but it is not often a recognized 
effect of a humanitarian intervention. NGOs are not explicit about the role they play in 
building the careers of locals employed in the non-profit sector, or increasing the legal 
and practical knowledge of government employees working to domesticate human rights 
law. These very important contributions to local contexts, however, deserve attention. 
 Contributions to Cameroonian human capital begin at the community level 
through the field activities of NGOs. While many projects involve a material aspect, such 
as distributing food or agricultural supplies, they also often involve a sensitization 
campaign to educate communities and build local autonomy. NGOs have held trainings in 
agricultural techniques to build the agricultural capacity of newly-settled refugees and 
hand-washing campaigns to improve hygiene and health outcomes in local communities. 
These sensitization campaigns, while often aimed at helping refugees settle into their new 
environment, can build the knowledge base of Cameroonian communities as well. 
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 Field activities can also strengthen existing local leadership. NGOs work with 
local chiefs and community leaders so that projects will hold legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community. Resources are often disbursed through the framework of existing local forms 
of governance, and local leaders receive additional training in how to effectively manage 
these resources. While these leaders certainly need no legitimation from international 
organizations to hold power in their local systems of governance, the training they 
receive from international NGOs ties them into kinds of systems that mesh with the 
bureaucratic functioning of the state, which may increase their legitimacy outside their 
communities and strengthen the state apparatus.
 Capacity-building also happens among Cameroonian employees of the NGOs 
themselves. Although many of my informants claimed motivations based on altruism and 
helping the vulnerable, at least as many said that they worked in humanitarianism 
because it was the most viable career path for them--their training or education was in 
fields related to humanitarianism. “Ce qui me motive, c’est de me dire que c’est mon 
travail, que c’est ce pour quoi je me suis formée, c’est l’expérience que j’ai eu”48 
(Natalie, interview 04/18/12). Many of the Cameroonian NGO employees talked about 
the difficulties of high unemployment rates in Cameroon; they stumbled into 
humanitarian work because that is what was available. “J’étais au quartier, je n’avais rien 
à faire. C’est comme ça qu’un jour, il y a un ami qui m’appelle, il me dit, ‘J’ai le 
Cameroon Tribune devant moi, on a besoin d’un assistant comptable à Plan Cameroon. 
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48 “What motivates me is saying to myself that this is my job, this is what I was trained for, this is the 
experience that I’ve had.”
Est-ce que ça t’intéresse ?’”49 (Gabrielle, interview 04/13/12). The experience of these 
informants illustrates that NGOs’ ability to create local jobs is a benefit to the host 
country. Once workers are hired, they benefit from career development and skill-building 
as part of their positions in the organizations. They develop valuable skills, from leading 
and organizing teams of employees to running educational campaigns in communities to 
producing and submitting formal reports on their activities. These skills, as well as their 
association with a well-regarded international agency, will serve them well throughout 
their careers. “Je travaille pour Plan à cause de la qualité de sa prestation. Aujourd’hui, je 
peux dire que si je pars de Plan, je vais partir avec quelque chose, cette expérience. Et, 
sincèrement, je voulais le nom de Plan dans mon CV”50 (Henri, interview 04/13/12). 
 NGOs also build capacity for other NGOs, developing the local NGO landscape 
that will take over upon the departure of international organizations. PU-AMI, for 
example, has an ongoing partnership with a small local organization that is involved in 
many similar projects. A PU-AMI staff member meets with the organization at least once 
a month to discuss such topics as transparent financial management. PU-AMI also 
periodically evaluates the organization’s activities, and helps the organization review 
what is working well and what could be improved. Through this partnership, PU-AMI 
hopes to impart its knowledge about how to run a successful and ethical NGO and to 
build local capacity to tackle local problems.
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49 “I was at home, I didn’t have anything to do. Then one a friend called me, he said ‘I have the Cameroon 
Tribune in from of me, they need an accounts assistant at Plan Cameroon. Does that interest you?’”
50 “I work for Plan because of the quality of its reputation. Today, I can say that if I leave Plan, I will leave 
with something, this experience. And, honestly, I wanted the name of Plan on my CV.”
 International organizations also invest in Cameroonian human capital through 
their work with government representatives. NGOs’ projects often involve relevant 
administrations: a project to build a classroom would work with the Ministry of Basic 
Education, at least ensuring that the Ministry is well-informed about any activities that 
might affect its work. Cooperation with governmental administrations sometimes requires 
providing further training for government employees. For example, Plan might train the 
Ministry of Public Health in handwashing procedures to help them oversee 
implementation of health recommendations. This kind of training brings local 
government officials into the fold of the “proper” way to do things as defined by the 
international organizations through their sensitization efforts. 
A final capacity-building effect of the international presence in the East 
happens on the level of government more abstractly. This aspect relates to Cameroon’s 
ability to implement international norms domestically. The UNHCR has supported and 
guided Cameroon through the process of establishing the 2005 refugee law and creating 
the governmental commissions that will implement it (the UNHCR, for instance, is one 
of the main funders supporting the creation of the commissions). In its capacity as the 
keeper of international norms related to refugees, the UNHCR sees ushering Cameroon 
toward more autonomy in refugee issues as its proper role. The representative from the 
Ministry of External Relations expressed the need for this guidance; how, he asked, could 
Cameroon ever conduct refugee status determinations itself if no one in the government 
knew the proper procedures? The UNHCR, as an international organization with decades 
of experience in diverse international contexts, has precedents on which to draw in 
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consulting with the Cameroonian government on the establishment of these procedures. 
In doing so, it builds the capacity not only of the Cameroonian employees it hires but of 
government functionaries and the administration itself.   
 
Solidifying governmental influence at the peripheries
 Jacobsen, in asking whether refugees can benefit the state, points out that the 
resources a refugee response brings to the host country may be difficult to access because 
refugees often inhabit peripheral regions less fully integrated into the centralized control 
of the state (2002). This is certainly the case in Cameroon; the East region has earned the 
nickname “the forgotten province” for the low levels of government attention and 
resources focused there. The East, as a border region, is marginal to the state apparatus 
centered in Yaoundé. While the East’s peripheral nature has previously made it of less 
concern to the Cameroonian state, it also makes it a fruitful site for solidification of 
government control and reinforcing of boundaries. 
 For most of the history of central Africa, state borders as we know them did not 
exist and movement was a normal part of people’s livelihood. As described in Chapter 
Two, Gbaya and Mbororo people spent time in areas that now fall into both Cameroon 
and the CAR, without external regulation of their travels. Today, movements across 
national borders generate more attention and concern. Maintaining defined boundaries is 
a central criterion of international standards of statehood, and refugees are dangerous in 
that they highlight the permeability of those boundaries (Fassin 2011; Malkki 1995a). An 
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influx of refugees presents states with the need and the opportunity to reinforce their 
presence in peripheral areas and to strengthen their borders (Jacobsen 2002). 
 The influx of refugees, combined with concerns about spillover violence, has 
prompted an increased government presence in the East. More security personnel have 
been sent to the region to deal with bandits in refugee settlements and conflicts between 
host communities and refugees (UNHCR 2009). In 2008, government forces secured the 
Cameroon-CAR border to prevent further cross-border raids by bandits (Parmar et al. 
2012:975). Government control in the region is certainly not perfect; Ministry of National 
Security personnel complain about the difficulty of classifying and keeping track of 
people (Quentin, interview 4/25/12). “Un grand problème de sécurité dans la région est la 
maîtrise de la nationalité. Parce que la sécurité passe par la maîtrise de la nationalité, il 
faut savoir qui est camerounais et qui ne l’est pas pour pouvoir sécuriser le pays”51 
(Quentin, interview 4/25/12). Although this process still poses challenges for national 
security forces, the perceived need to classify and categorize people to keep a firm grip 
on the region is a sign of crystallization of government power in the area. 
 Such expansion of governmental power to the East reinforces Ferguson’s 
argument: 
 Outcomes that at first appear as mere ‘side effects’ of an unsuccessful attempt to 
 engineer an economic transformation become legible in another perspective as 
 unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that has the 
 effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while 
 simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect. [Ferguson 1990:20-21] 
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51 “One big security problem in the region is control of nationality. Because security depends on control of 
nationality; we have to know who is Cameroonian and who isn’t in order to secure the country.”
Certainly, cementing government control at the margins of Cameroon’s territory was not 
explicit in the plan of the UNHCR and its NGO partners. In this sense, any reinforcing of 
Cameroonian state power is unintended and tangential to the “true” purpose of the 
international community’s presence in the country. It is precisely the invisibility granted 
by that tangentiality that makes these political effects so powerful. Expansion of 
government control to the East, when linked to the refugee response effort, does not 
overtly appear to be a political move, no matter its collateral political consequences. An 
increased security presence in the region to monitor unstable conditions such as the 
presence of bandits may be warranted; however, it also lends itself to increased 
surveillance of Cameroonian citizens by a government that has proven itself less than 
forgiving of any activities it considers subversive. 
Conclusion 
 The reinforcing of state power in the East that occurs in conjunction with the 
refugee response is an overarching political consequence of the international presence in 
the region. As NGOs channel international resources to provide necessities, salaries, 
business, and infrastructure to local communities, they contribute to the development of 
the East and bring it more in line with levels of development nationwide. Contributions to 
Cameroon’s development also raise its status at an international level, helping it conform 
to ideals of an autonomous, sovereign state. NGOs also build Cameroonian human 
capital, training those who will run the national non-profit sector as well as those who 
administer the government at local and national levels. Finally, the focused attention and 
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energy that the presence of international actors brings to the “forgotten province” of the 
East creates incentive for the government to regulate and control this border area and to 
enforce the boundary between Cameroon and the CAR. A stricter security presence helps 
keep out bandits, but also imposes government standards of control on the region. All of 
these effects, while not included in the altruistic discourse surrounding the intervention, 
combine to allow Cameroon to incorporate the East more fully into the state, and to 
reaffirm its very statehood by extending greater influence over this border region. 
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Chapter Five
Applied Anthropology, Policy-Making, and Studying Success
 Chapter Three looked at evidence of the refugee regime’s shifts toward a 
routinized intervention process in Cameroon. Such movement to a professionalized, 
evidence-based approach is the result of conscious efforts among practitioners and 
decision-makers to make their work more effective (Darcy et al. 2013). After mistakes 
made in earlier crises, the regime has responded to critiques by developing more 
innovative and effective models. These shifts raise questions about the role of 
anthropology in influencing practical decision-making and about the ethics of applied 
anthropology. My thesis, as it examines the regime’s approach in Cameroon, enters into 
this conversation about evaluation and humanitarian policy. My own observations and 
suggests that the professionalization of humanitarianism will further blur the distinction 
between academic and applied anthropology; academic critiques of humanitarianism, 
whether they intend to or not, have tangible effects on policy. The interplay between 
academic critique, practitioner evaluation, and policy implementation is key to 
understanding the dynamics at play when a professionalized international regime 
responds to a routinized refugee crisis such as that in eastern Cameroon.
Anthropology in the World of Evaluation and Policy Making
Humanitarian decision-making
 In 2012, Tufts University and the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) 
undertook a study on “The Use of Evidence in Humanitarian Decision Making” (Darcy et  
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al. 2013). The impetus for the study was the shifting nature of humanitarian decision-
making processes: 
 The pressure to demonstrate that responses and claims about impact are grounded 
 in evidence has been growing over recent years. Humanitarian donors are 
 increasingly under similar pressures to those faced by other public sector 
 colleagues...to demonstrate effectiveness and account for impact in ways that they 
 have not previously been expected to do. [Darcy et al. 2013:5] 
Recognizing that humanitarian decisions are often made in “non-ideal” contexts, the 
study examines how decision-makers currently use the information at their disposal to 
make “well enough” informed decisions given the circumstances. There is a new 
emphasis on using evidence, from the crisis at hand and from past crises, to inform the 
choice of intervention in a given case.  
 “In the past, responding to crises consisted of a small number of prepackaged 
interventions, thought to be the viable options for responding, yet not based on much 
evidence (Levine and Chastre 2004). Major changes have occurred in the humanitarian 
sector over the last decade or so” with regards to tailoring the intervention to the specific 
context of the crisis (Darcy et al. 2013:25). Ideally, decision-makers draw on evidence 
from a variety of sources when making decisions about how to approach a specific crisis, 
including pre-crisis knowledge about the region in question, information about the 
evolving crisis itself, and evidence about what has worked in other situations (Darcy et al. 
2013:19). In reality, however, “assessment evidence has been found to play a marginal, or 
even negligible, role within agencies” in some cases (Darcy et al. 2013:25). A range of 
external factors, from personal relationships between humanitarian actors to government 
policy in the recipient country, influence decisions at least as much as evidence does. In 
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addition, support for innovative solutions to respond to the particularities of a given crisis 
is often limited: “”the tendency is to stick to the traditional interventions, whether or not 
the evidence supports them” (Darcy et al. 2013:29). As I argued in Chapter Three, the 
culture around flexibility in a response is shifting in the Cameroonian intervention, but 
these norms may not yet have diffused throughout the global humanitarian community.
 The conclusions of the ACAPS study suggest that processes of humanitarian 
decision-making are at an important crossroads: ideas about evidence-based policy-
making are changing the ways decisions are made, but the reality of decision-making 
often does not match the ideal. What role should academia, and anthropology in 
particular, play in the ongoing transformation of the culture of humanitarian decision-
making? What are the most useful ways for scholars to add to the base of evidence used 
to create informed and effective policies? 
Applied anthropology: Ethics and inevitability
 The first of these questions leads inevitably into the ongoing debate within the 
discipline of anthropology about the appropriateness of an applied perspective. Is 
contributing to effective policy-making anthropology’s role? If research is intended 
mainly to “create knowledge and explain physical and social phenomena,” (Tamale 
2011:13) should that purpose be kept separate from activities aimed at making changes to 
the physical and social phenomena that scholars observe? There are those who would 
answer this question affirmatively, but others argue that scholarship needs to take a more 
active role in the world. Anthropology, perhaps more than other disciplines, has a well-
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established applied tradition, reaching back to E.E. Evans-Pritchard, one of the fathers of 
the discipline (Evans-Pritchard 1946). Increasingly, anthropologists are hired as 
consultants for international aid organizations, from the UNHCR to the World Bank, to 
use their expertise to problem-solve for these agencies. On one hand, blurring the lines on 
the continuum from academic to applied anthropology can raise some ethical concerns: 
How will a scholar’s affiliation with a specific organization affect her access and the 
quality of her research? How does one handle the ambiguity when informants may also 
be recipients of aid? How legitimate is the notion of an outsider’s “expertise” on a group? 
On the other hand, attempts to maintain a strict separation between academia and 
advocacy raise ethical questions of their own: How long can or should a scholar stand by 
and document atrocities without intervening?
 Many anthropologists make a strong case for an applied perspective within the 
discipline. As anthropology has, over the past few decades, reexamined its identity and 
come to terms with some of the problematic aspects of its past relationship to colonial 
projects, some anthropologists seek to “take responsibility for the potential effects of the 
knowledge produced about people and their cultures, to contribute to decolonizing the 
relationship between researcher and research subject...and to engage in a form of 
anthropology that [is] committed to human liberation” (Speed 2006:67). The growing 
importance of NGOs in international relations, and the increasing trend of anthropologists 
working for them, means that the applied perspective in anthropology cannot be ignored 
(Hackenberg 2000). Certainly, challenges remain for those who would apply 
anthropology, particularly around granting anthropologists “expert status” in policy-
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making processes; anthropologists are actively grappling with these challenges, and the 
question of how to create an ethically applied anthropology remains (Sillitoe 2007). 
Many scholars are dedicated to this grappling, though, because of their determination not 
to “use their data as a pillow” when they return home from the field; they want their 
research to contribute to something beyond their own careers (Kirksey 2009). 
 My own experience among humanitarian NGOs in Bertoua suggests that a clear-
cut division between scholarly anthropology and application of knowledge is no longer 
one we can even reasonably claim to make. Even when those working for NGOs or other 
humanitarian organizations are not anthropologists themselves, they are influenced by 
scholarly perspectives on their work. As explained in Chapter Three, I encountered 
informants who echoed the ideas I had studied in academic critiques of humanitarian 
work. Particularly as the field of humanitarianism becomes more professionalized, those 
working for these NGOs will have completed studies focused on humanitarianism, and 
their familiarity with academic perspectives will guide their work in the field. Whether 
directly intended or not, anthropological knowledge affects policy; it concerns “real 
outcomes for real people” (Darcy et al. 2013:5). Recognizing this inevitability may help 
us make the academia-application link more intentional and effective.
The role of positive case studies in evaluation research
 Recently, in conversation with a professor from another department, I mentioned 
that I was an anthropology major with a concentration in Human Rights and 
Humanitarianism. He responded, “So, you must have spent four years learning why 
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everything you ever wanted to do with your life is wrong.” Though he was teasing, he 
made a valid point about anthropology as a discipline, particularly in the realms of human 
rights and humanitarianism. Anthropologists tend to study topics related to crises; they 
seek out situations where people are suffering or being taken advantage of. Moreover, 
when they study efforts to respond to these situations, they tend to be highly critical, 
deconstructing these efforts and looking at any parts of them that may not be working. 
This was certainly my experience of the anthropological study of humanitarianism before 
I departed for Cameroon. Is this the only “right” way to approach humanitarian studies? 
In scholarship that recognizes its inevitable impacts on policy in the world, I believe, 
there is a place for studying what is working alongside studying what is going wrong. 
The combination of these two perspectives can help policy-makers address problems in 
their approach without feeling the need to deconstruct the entire system.  
 An anthropological preoccupation with global problems is illustrated in Oliver-
Smith’s 1996 article about research on hazards and disasters. He affirms that this has 
become a significant subfield of study in anthropology, whose proliferation has spurred 
the emergence of several approaches to studying these topics. Among these approaches 
are the behavioral and organizational response approach, the social change and 
development approach, and the political economy approach (Oliver-Smith 1996:305; 
314). The multiplicity of anthropological ways of understanding disasters speaks to a 
certain orientation within the discipline toward situations where everything is going 
wrong, where injustices are being committed and peoples’ lives turned upside down. 
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 Neil Thin also speaks strongly to the negativity-focused perspective found in most 
of the social sciences. Studies of human rights, he says, “have always been more about 
wrongs than rights” (Thin 2012:10). Despite significant progress in recent years toward 
promoting human rights for all, scholars continue to focus on abuses and transgressions 
(Thin 2012:10). “Subjective experience, particularly if it is good experience, goes largely 
unrepresented in human rights reports” (Thin 2012:11). Anthropology, with its research 
tradition of participant observation and recent trends toward recognizing the value of 
subjectivity in research, might be uniquely positioned to bring this understanding of 
positive subjective experience to the study of human rights. However, as Thin declares, 
anthropology has “for much of its history showed minimal interest in how people actually  
experience the social and cultural institutions through which they organise their 
lives” (Thin 2012:9). Where there have been recent movements toward anthropological 
study of such subjective topics as emotion, as in the work of Wendy James (1997), the 
focus is still on negative emotions like fear.
 There are very compelling reasons for choosing to study situations of disaster and 
cases where everything seems to be going wrong. For applied anthropologists, an 
understanding of what is going wrong is crucial to effectively working to set it right. A 
problem-focused orientation in anthropology may also be about moving the discipline 
away from a problematic past. In the face of accusations about anthropologists’ roles in 
perpetuating colonialism or in essentializing the marginalized groups they often studied, a 
human-rights and problem-solving focus in anthropology is a way to reclaim the 
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discipline. These are compelling reasons for choosing these topics, and anthropology can 
bring much-needed micro-level, community perspectives to understandings of disasters. 
 An overarching argument of my thesis has been, however, that investigating the 
successful aspects of an international intervention can also yield significant insights. In 
Cameroon, it is precisely the fact that the refugee response is proceeding smoothly that 
introduces the possibility for that response to contribute to Cameroon’s development. 
Beyond the ways in which this perspectives gives us a more well-rounded understanding 
of how the refugee regime operates today in routinized crises, such an approach can also 
contribute to the above-discussed processes of evaluation-based policy making. 
 The contributions of evaluation of successful cases to effective policy making are 
at the core of Thin’s argument. He contends that an approach focused on the positive can 
legitimately lead to better policy-making to address problems. How, he asks, can we 
create effective policies whose ultimate goal is to promote people’s well-being if we have 
no academic context for understanding well-being and the situations that produce it (Thin 
2012:7)? Empirical study of positive outcomes, he argues, can better inform policy-
making to promote those outcomes. These ideas align with the conclusions of scholars 
engaged in studying evaluative practices in the humanitarian field. The ACAPS study, for 
instance, concluded that an understanding of which intervention models work is missing 
from the approach of decision makers. “The evidence base proving which humanitarian 
responses are most effective is extremely lacking. Investments must be made in the 
consolidation of evidence about what works in response to different kinds of needs in 
different contexts” (Darcy et al. 2013:33). Though an academic focus on problem-solving 
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is an important component of transforming humanitarian action, research that focuses on 
what is working in cases of success also has an important contribution to make. As the 
humanitarian field continues shifting toward a more evaluation-based approach to 
decision making, academic tools for evaluating effective programming will become even 
more crucial to shaping the international humanitarian landscape.
Conclusion
 There are undoubtedly some elements of the approach to the refugee response in 
eastern Cameroon that could have been handled more effectively. The concerns about 
corruption which came up repeatedly in my interviews are just one example of areas 
where problems may have arisen. In constructing this thesis, however, I have chosen to 
focus mainly on the successes of the refugee integration effort in Cameroon, and the 
implications of that success for Cameroon’s development. This reflects the understanding 
that, for my informants, the lived reality of their day-to-day work is one of implementing 
proven strategies to create tangible improvements in people’s lives. It also proceeds from 
an understanding of anthropology as naturally engaged in the events of the world, and of 
a best-practices approach to evaluation research as having a positive contribution to make 
to policy making. The Cameroonian case examined in this thesis is significant not only 
for what it can tell us about how integration works, or how international humanitarian aid 
can contribute to the development of host states, but for the questions it prompts us to ask 
about how we conduct anthropology, both in terms of how we choose to approach our 
research and of our understanding of how that research affects action in the world. 
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
 I arrived in eastern Cameroon to do my field research at a crucial point in the 
unfolding of a refugee intervention. The initial phase, that of providing emergency relief 
such as food and shelter to refugees as they arrived, had concluded. Those organizations, 
such as MSF, which concern themselves primarily with meeting these urgent needs had 
already left the region. In most cases, whether in the media or in academic study of 
refugee crises, this early stage captures the most attention. We are intrigued by this time 
when thousands of people are on the move, emotions run high, and much--meaning 
human lives--is at stake. In Cameroon, where even this emergency stage received only 
minimal media coverage, very little attention has been given to what happens next, when 
the influx of refugees ceases52, people are settled, and the imminent danger of death 
abates. My field research, examining NGOs’ activities during this second stage, revealed 
a seemingly unremarkable process of professional humanitarian workers going about 
their work, bringing a measure of relief to communities in need of assistance.
 My argument throughout this thesis, however, has been that the straightforward 
nature of refugee relief efforts in eastern Cameroon is precisely what makes it 
remarkable. My informants, particularly those who had worked in humanitarian 
interventions in other countries, recognized Cameroon as a uniquely good place to work. 
Here, in the absence of a plethora of complicating factors, they could simply get their 
jobs done. In Cameroon, the refugee intervention seems to be working more or less as it 
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52 A resurgence of violence in the CAR in early 2013, and subsequent resurgence of refugees fleeing into 
eastern Cameroon, has undoubtedly changed the scenario described here. For some initial information and 
thoughts on this most recent influx, see Timchia (2013) and Schlein (2013). 
was designed to, successfully implementing humanitarian principles and best practices in 
a context of local integration. The Cameroonian case is important for its illustration of 
humanitarian action in such a “routinized” response.
 Two unusual factors initially drew my interest to refugees in Cameroon. The first 
was the way refugees are directly integrated into existing Cameroonian communities, 
without use of refugee camps. This factor proved key to understanding the success of the 
relief effort. Here, as well, the issue of temporality is important. While refugee camps 
might be useful in the initial stages of an influx--by concentrating refugees in one place, 
they simplify the distribution of aid--integration holds many benefits in a longer-term 
situation. Settling refugees into communities allows them to regain a sense of 
“normalcy,” integrating into local patterns of social and economic life rather than 
continuously feeling suspended between one place and another. 
 It also broadens the scope of who can assist the refugees and their host 
communities. In eastern Cameroon, because refugees are integrated into local 
communities, they receive aid not only from refugee-focused NGOs such as PU-AMI but 
also from development organizations such as Plan Cameroon, which would assist those 
communities regardless of the refugees’ presence. This approach is beneficial not only to 
refugees but to local Cameroonians and to the state as a whole. Integrating refugees 
allows them to contribute economically to their villages; focusing humanitarian relief 
resources on Cameroonian communities contributes to ongoing development efforts. 
Thus, use of local integration as a solution to the refugee influx in eastern Cameroon adds 
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not only to the success of the refugee response, but to the “side effects” of the response 
on Cameroon’s process of state-building. 
 The second unusual factor that drew me to Cameroon is the very lack of attention 
focused on the refugee response. Given the prominence to which refugees have risen as a 
topic for anthropological research, I had expected that, in spite of its relatively small 
scale, the refugee situation in Cameroon would have been studied by someone. Given the 
rather low level of international political interest focused on either the CAR or on 
Cameroon, however, and given the lack of major blunders in the organizational response 
to the refugee influx, perhaps it is not surprising that refugees in Cameroon have escaped 
notice. It could appear, on the surface, as if nothing particularly interesting is happening: 
refugees arrive, they are assisted by the UNHCR and its partner organizations, and they 
settle into host communities. The tacit impacts on Cameroon’s national development, 
however, and the questions this raises about why and how Cameroon chooses to 
accommodate these refugees, certainly add interest not immediately obvious on the 
surface. This is one argument for studying cases of success in the realm of humanitarian 
interventions: sometimes more is happening than meets the eye. 
 Another argument, suggested by the discussion of evaluation practices and 
applied anthropology in Chapter Five, is that understanding what works in a given 
situation helps us formulate better policy to address other situations. Our understanding 
of how to respond to refugee emergencies is incomplete if we only study cases of failure. 
It is certainly important to understand what went wrong to avoid such mistakes in the 
future. However, we also need to understand proactive ways to foster success.
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 I have thus, in this thesis, presented an argument for the importance of studying a 
seemingly marginal refugee situation and the international response to that situation. I 
have described the approach taken by the UNHCR and its partner organizations in 
responding to the refugee influx from the CAR, and have explored some of the 
implications of that response for Cameroon’s development as a state. Ultimately, I argue, 
the benefits accruing to Cameroon from the local integration of refugees helps reinforce 
Cameroon’s position as a sovereign state within the “national order of things.” My 
analysis of the situation, however, is limited by constraints of time and access. Future 
scholars, building on the introduction I present here, could deepen the understanding of 
what is going right in Cameroon. 
 One important issue for further investigation is that of the implementation of the 
2005 refugee law: as the Cameroonian government begins taking responsibility for 
refugee status determinations, what are the effects on the situation of refugees on the 
ground? Another important development to monitor will be what happens when the 
situation in the CAR stabilizes enough that it is deemed safe for people to return. 
Refugees from Chad, longtime residents of northern Cameroon, were beginning the 
repatriation process at the time of my field research. Will Central African refugees, who 
have settled into and become part of their host communities, eventually be urged to leave 
those communities and return “home?” What effects would such a repatriation effort have 
on the East as a region? 
 A final interesting process to watch will be the withdrawal of humanitarian 
organizations from the East. Organizations such as PU-AMI understand their role to be 
temporary--they arrive in response to an emergency, and leave when the emergency is 
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over. Though, as I have described, PU-AMI is making efforts to assure continuity, it is 
likely that there will be something of a gap left behind when the organization departs. In 
addition, the definitive declaration of the end of an emergency is not an easy one to make, 
as evidenced by PU-AMI’s continued presence in eastern Cameroon after the departure of 
other organizations such as MSF. The process of decision-making on PU-AMI’s part 
about when it is time to leave Cameroon will be interesting to follow for those interested 
in the separation and confluence of humanitarianism and development.
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